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MEASURING THE VALUE OF SLAVES AND FREE
PERSONS IN ANCIENT LAW
JAMES LINDGREN*
Not all people are considered equal. There have always been
those who would treat others as less than fully human. Humans were
not considered equal when Thomas Jefferson claimed that all men are
created so-the same Jefferson who later enslaved his own relatives.'
Humans were not considered equal in our earliest surviving law codes
and collections (as this Study documents). And we are not all consid-
ered equal today.
With slavery having been almost eradicated in the modem world,
the question of equality has replaced freedom as the world's chief
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law: Ph.D. Student, Sociology, University
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This Article was written as part of my graduate work in Sociology for Martha Roth of the
Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago. It was presented at Berkeley at the March 1995
conference on Ancient Law, Economics, and Society, at the Demography Workshop at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and at faculty workshops at the Northwestern, Boston University, and
George Washington law schools. Earlier versions of some of these tables were distributed as
part of a panel presentation at the American Society for Legal History meetings in Washington,
D.C. in October 1994. Part of Part VI will also appear in James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May
Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 29 (1995).
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mond Westbrook, Laurent Mayali, Marie-Theres F~gen, David Johnston, Bernard Jackson,
Klaas Veenhof, N.P. Lemche, Peter Stein, James Whitman, Richard Helmholz, Ross
Stolzenberg, Richard Posner, Charles Gray, Philip Hamburger, Saul Levmore, Robert Ellickson,
Jacob Corre, Robert Cooter, and Geoffrey Miller. I would like to thank the Freehling Scholar-
ship Fund of the Chicago-Kent College of Law and the University of Chicago Sociology Depart-
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1. Even if you discount the story that Sally Hemings bore Jefferson's children as unproven,
those who defend Jefferson do not dispute that Hemings' children were still Jefferson's relatives,
since Hemings was the daughter of John Wayles (the father of Jefferson's wife Martha). Thus, at
the very least, Jefferson enslaved his wife's half-sister (and half-brothers and their descendants).
Also, Jefferson's modem defenders usually say that the father of Hemings' children was really
Peter or Samuel Carr (Jefferson's nephews). Thus, even if Thomas Jefferson is not the father of
Hemings' children, he is related to them both by blood and by marriage. Further, since Sally
Hemings' mother was one-quarter white, Sally's children would be less than one-quarter black.
Under Virginia law, her children were white and could not be legally enslaved. Thus, Jefferson's
enslavement of his family members was illegal as well as immoral. Moreover, Jefferson once
wrote in his notebooks that some of his slaves were probably legally white. See Paul Finkelman,
Jefferson and Slavery: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES
181-221 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993).
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political concern. Among the hundreds of thousands of popular and
academic writings on inequality, tens of thousands of them have tried
to document differences between social classes or demographic
groups. Wage gaps, discrimination gaps, and the like are the common
fodder of public discourse. Differences between classes have been
studied within nations and among nations by sociologists, economists,
governments, and multi-national organizations. 2 What has not been
measured until now is the comparative valuation of persons in ancient
law collections.
This Study compares the valuation of slaves, freed slaves, half-
free persons, free persons, and the nobility in ancient law systems
from 2100 B.c. through A.D. 700. The price schedules for wrongs done
to different classes of people are set out in considerable detail in many
ancient law collections. These price schedules give us some indication
of how these societies were stratified and what values were ascribed to
the bodies and dignities of different classes. To ascertain the valua-
tions, I quantified the relative prices for harms done to different sorts
of people. If, for example, a particular harm to a slave was by law
punished only 33% as severely as the same harm done to a free per-
son, then a slave's valuation under that provision would be 33%.
Almost all ancient civilizations leaving codes3 and law collections
that have been translated into English are represented, although I in-
2. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU & OTIS D. DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUC-
TURE (1967); SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (David B. Grusky ed., 1994); James A. Davis, Achievement Variables and Class Cultures:
Family, Schooling, Job, and Forty-Nine Dependent Variables in the Cumulative GSS, 47 AM. Soc.
REV. 569 (1982); William H. Sewell et al., Sex, Schooling, and Occupational Status, 86 AM. J.
Soc. 551 (1980); Erik O. Wright, A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure, 13
PoL & Soc'Y 383 (1984).
3. In ancient law, no issue has been debated as extensively as whether these ancient law
collections, particularly the ones from before the birth of Jesus, ought to be called "codes." See,
e.g., JEAN BOTrtRO, MESOPOTAMIA: WRITING, REASONING, AND THE GODS 156-84 (Zainab
Bahrani & Marc van De Mieroop trans., 1992); Jacob J. Finkelstein, Ammisaduqa's Edict and the
Babylonian 'Law Codes,' 15 J. CUNEIFORM STUD. 91 (1961); Raymond Westbrook, Biblical and
Cuneiform Law Codes, 92 REVUE BIBLIOUE 247 (1985). The debate is too complex to be reca-
pitulated here, but it turns in part on whether these were comprehensive enough to be called
codes and in part on whether these were treated as prescriptive law.
The first argument, which usually contrasts these collections with the Code Napoleon, is an
odd one, at least as applied to the more substantial law collections. Bott6ro has argued that
"The law code of a land is first of all a complete collection of the laws and prescriptions that
govern the land: 'the totality of its legislation."' BoxarrRO, supra, at 161. Although I am skepti-
cal that Bottdro is correct about the French use of the word "code"-what about the Code Noir
(1685)?-as applied to the meaning of the modern English word "code," Bott6ro's statement is
either wrong or irrelevant (limited as it is to a code "of a land").
The meaning of a word cannot be determined by comparison to its most extreme examples.
Must one be Michael Jordan to be an athlete? Is Lutheranism the only Protestant sect? The
scope of the Code of Hammurabi is certainly much broader than the scope of the Model Penal
Code, a nonbinding code that was drafted for state adoption. Even though no state has adopted
[Vol. 71:149
1995] MEASURING THE VALUE OF SLAVES AND FREE PERSONS 151
cluded only the earliest one or two for each civilization. 4 In the tables
in this Article, I describe, extract, and classify over 300 provisions that
make distinctions based on class in seventeen ancient law collections.
For the four Mesopotamian collections, I had access to new transla-
tions by Martha Roth;5 for the other codes or collections, I used trans-
lations of varying quality and age. Geographically, the codes range
from India through Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, Palestine, (Grecian)
Crete, Rome, Germanic Europe, and Britain. The ancient Chinese
T'ang Code6 and the Japanese Yoro Code,7 among others, are ex-
it in its entirety, no one hesitates to call the Model Penal Code a "code." The French Code Noir
dealt with slaves, the Uniform Commercial Code deals with commerce, and a university's code of
conduct may deal mostly with a narrow range of student concerns. Many codes today are not
binding law (a code of conduct for broadcasters or advertisers). They are often promulgated to
guide business people, lawyers, judges, or legislators.
I have done NEXIS searches of newspapers and magazines to determine the ordinary mean-
ings of "code" and "law collection." The word "code" is very rarely used to refer to a compre-
hensive body of binding law representing the core of a country's statutes. It usually refers to
nonbinding collections of rules. In ordinary usage, the words "law collection" usually refer to a
library's collection of unrelated legal books and periodicals. I found no use in NEXIS of "law
collection" in the sense these words are used by historians today. The words "law collection" are
not more precise than the word "code." The words "law collection" are what some grammarians
call "covering language," vague words that raise few images at all. What images they do raise
are probably more false than the ones raised by the word "code."
The second main argument made-that the codes may not have been prescriptive law-is a
much more substantial one. It may be that they are what American lawyers call "restatements"
or perhaps "digests." Yet modem restatements of the common law were generally thought of as
attempts to "codify" the common law, even though they often were not designed to be enacted
in whole as prescriptive law. Since codes need not be binding, perhaps "code" is the right word
after all for the ancient law collections.
In short, historians may have a much better idea than a modem lawyer like myself about the
uses of these law collections, but historians do not necessarily know what the word "code"
means. It may be more pedantic than precise to call them "law collections." However, since
that usage is the convention (and I am a lowly graduate student new to the field), I will usually
use the words "law collections" instead of "codes."
The purpose of this footnote is not to challenge the reigning orthodoxy-that would require
a careful review of each of the arguments made for the conventional terminology. Rather, I
want to explain what may otherwise appear to be ignorance or terminological sloppiness. One
should not take offense with my iconoclastic ways. I'm harmless.
4. Excluded, for example, are the later Mesopotamian law collections and the later Roman
and Greek law collections (which have been extensively analyzed elsewhere). See, e.g., JILL
HARRIES & IAN WOOD, THE THEODOSIAN CODE (1993) (discussing the Theodosian Code);
MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR (Piotr
Michalowski ed., 1995) (translating the Neo-Babylonian Laws (ca. 700 B.C.) and the Middle As-
syrian Laws (ca. 1076 B.c.)).
5. RoTH, supra note 4.
6. See THE T'ANG CODE: VOLUME 1, GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Wallace Johnson trans., 1979)
(translation of 57 of the 502 articles of the T'ang Code of A.D. 627-659); Wallace Johnson, Status
& Liability for Punishment in the T'ang Code, 71 Cm-.-KENr L. REV. 217 (1995).
7. See 1 DAVID J. Lu, SOURCES OF JAPANESE HISTORY 26-32 (1974) (excerpts from Yoro
Code); RICHARD J. MILLER, JAPAN'S FIRST BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF EIGHTH CENTURY
GOVERNMENT 22-55 (1978) (discusses origins and context of Yoro Code of A.D. 718); NIHONGI:
CHRONICLES OF JAPAN FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO A.D. 697 (W.G. Aston trans., 1972) (ex-
cerpts from Yoro Code); 1 RYUSAKU TSUNODA ET AL., SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION 68-80
(1958) (excerpts from Yoro Code of A.D. 718).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
cluded because they remain mostly untranslated into English.8 I also
excluded other codes that cannot be firmly tied down to the pre-A.D.
700 era (i.e., pre-Charlemagne). 9
According to the data presented here, in ancient law collections
slaves were valued at a mean of only 33% of a free person.' 0 Freed
slaves were valued at only 53% of free." Nobility showed a wide vari-
ation, averaging 4.65 times the value of an ordinary free person.12 Be-
yond these broad findings are several other interesting patterns.
Dignitary wrongs such as face-slapping show wider variations between
social classes than more narrowly economic harms. 13 And much like
the antebellum American South, field slaves are valued less than
house slaves.14 Unlike American slavery, however, the ascribed value
of slaves in ancient law was only 33%, not 60% (as in the United
States Constitution's population computations15).
This Study also supports several findings of historians of ancient
slavery-for example, (1) that freed slaves were still dependent
classes, not far above the class of slaves,16 and (2) that slaves per-
formed an extremely wide variety of tasks in ancient societies. 17 In-
deed, highly skilled slaves were sometimes valued above average free
persons.18
The differences within basic classes are often huge. For example,
some slaves belonging to the king are valued at 33 times more than
other slaves. As noted, some slaves (e.g., goldsmiths) are valued
8. A later Japanese code has been translated. THE LAWS OF THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU
(Kenneth A. Grossberg ed. & trans. & Kanamoto Nobuhisa trans., 1981) (translation of Kemnmu
Shikimoku (1336) and Muromachi Bakufu Tsuikah).
9. See, e.g., CELTIC LAW PAPERS (Dafydd Jenkins ed. & trans., 1973) (mainly Welsh and
Irish laws); TiH EARLIEST NORWEGIAN LAWS (Laurence M. Larson trans., 1935) (translations of
the Gulathing Law and the Frostathing Law); 2 THOMAS P. ELLIS, WELSH TRIBAL LAW AND
CUSTOM IN THE MIDDLE AGES 65-192 (1982) (Welsh law of crime and torts); SIDNEY FAIR-
BANKS, TIHE OLD WEST FRISIAN SKELTANA RIucHT (1939) (translation of West Frisian Code); 1
ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 446-52
(1915) (Egyptian Edict of Harmhab, contains no differences in price schedule for wrongs); THE
LAW OF HYWEL DDA (Dafydd Jenkins ed. & trans., 1986) [hereinafter THE LAW OF HYWEL
DDA] (translation of medieval Welsh code); LAWS OF THE SALIAN AND RIPUARIAN FRANKS
(Theodore J. Rivers trans., 1986) (includes translation of Lex Ribuaria, which is too derivative of
the Salic laws to be included here).
10. See infra Tables 29-31.
11. See infra Tables 29, 31-32.
12. See infra Tables 29, 32.
13. See infra Table 5.
14. See infra Tables 23-24.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
16. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 240-61 (1982) (describing the
degraded status, both socially and legally, of freed slaves across a wide variety of slave societies).
17. See, e.g., THOMAS WIEDEMANN, GREEK AND ROMAN SLAVERY (1981).
18. See infra Tables 17 & 19.
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higher than some free men.19 Within free classes, the differences can
also be large. In the Laws of Ine, a harm to a bishop is punished 34
times more seriously than the same harm to a landed nobleman, even
though both are upper-class persons. 20
More broadly, the data in this Study are consistent with a suppo-
sition that law was a tool of imposing and enforcing class hierarchy
across all ancient legal systems that were sophisticated enough to de-
velop a code of laws. Further, these data do not support the efficiency
of ancient law that some modern theorists have found, for a slave sys-
tem is unlikely to be economically efficient in the simplest sense, re-
stricting labor from freely moving to its highest and best use.
These data also provide a statistical base for comparisons with the
class relations in any particular ancient or modem civilization. In-
deed, the relative valuation of nobility compared to free persons in
ancient law systems (4.65 to 1) is eerily similar to the level of income
difference between high and low prestige jobs that Americans today
think proper (about 4 to 1).21
Last, this Study is intended to broaden the use of both ancient
law and legal empiricism. It hints at some of the richness of ancient
codes for modem theorists of race, class, gender, economics, sociol-
ogy, jurisprudence, crime, and torts.22 Law professors tend to read
narrowly only in law and those pockets of philosophy and social sci-
ence that have become part of legal scholarship. Once some of these
codes are more widely discussed by legal scholars, they will be used by
others to enrich research that has little to do with the concerns of this
study. Further, I designed this study as part of my over-arching desire
to advance a developing school in academic law-the New Empiri-
cism-and to show how the range of legal questions subject to quanti-
tative techniques can be broadened in time, place, scope, and subject.
19. See infra Table 17.
20. See infra Table 27.
21. Jonathan Kelley & M.D.R. Evans, The Legitimation of Inequality: Occupational Earn-
ings in Nine Nations, 99 AM. J. Soc. 75 (1993).
22. For using ancient law to ask modem questions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE 119-227 (1981); RAPHAEL SEALEY, WOMEN AND LAW IN CLASSICAL GREECE 50-
81 (1990) (discussing women in Gortyn); Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety
and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul Levmore,
Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STuD. 43
(1987); James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76
B.U. L. REV. 29 (1995).
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I. WHY COUNT CLASS DIFFERENCES?
In some respects, ancient class differences are a far more appro-
priate topic for counting than you might think. It might seem anach-
ronistic to believe that quantifying ancient law makes any sense, but it
is probably more anachronistic to impute our modern notions of the
ineffable incomparability of human worth. A wergeld, after all, was a
"man's price."'23 In some sense (which can be much debated), the
wergeld was treated as the ascribed value of that person. Theodore
Rivers describes the relation of the blood-feud to the wergeld:
Characteristic of primitive societies that lack a strong central gov-
ernment, such as Frankish society, is a phenomenon known as the
blood feud, the perpetuating series of killings and counterkillings
between members of two different kindreds. Since the kindred was
marked by a strong sense of collective solidarity, it required that all
its members be accountable for the actions of any of its members.
Therefore, in order to maintain peace between potentially feuding
kindreds, a monetary payment called the wergeld or leodgeld was
instituted, which compensated the victim's kin with a payment equal
to the victim's status within Frankish society. The wergeld was
equivalent to a person's legal value .... When the victim's kin ac-
cepted payment of the wergeld, the feud ceased, at least in theory.
But the wergeld was originally only a very poor attempt, at best, to
put an end to familial reprisals of violence. . . . Since Germanic
society was a caste system, different classes had different wergelds.
The value of the property and the status of the victim or owner
were the criteria by which crimes in Frankish society were re-
dressed. Since all crimes had an equivalent value whose payment
was assumed to amend the wrong of a crime, a graduated scale of
composition-the monetary payment that settled a debt-evolved
from this mentality. Composition was applicable to both the wer-
geld payment for homicide and the simple monetary compensation
for all remaining types of crimes.24
The statutory schedules often set out elaborate explicit values depend-
ing on one's station in life. At least for the lawgivers, these values
were real and explicit. James Whitman remarks, "On their face, the
archaic codes belong, not to a modern world characterized by the po-
licing of the streets, but to a pre-modern world characterized by the
deeply felt need to set just prices."' 25 This Study compares these "just
prices."
23. See THE EARLIEST NORWEGIAN LAWS, supra note 9, at 150-63.
24. LAWS OF THE SALIAN AND RIPUARIAN FRANKS, supra note 9, at 14-15 (emphasis
added).
25. James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutila-
tion of Bodies, or Setting of Prices, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 81 (1995).
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Second, the lawgivers have solved the inherent incomparability
problem by reducing their opinions about persons and classes to
money or weighted metal. Sometimes, as in the Hittite Laws, the
schedule of wrongs was revised, suggesting a positive use needing revi-
sion.26 Sometimes, as in the Lombard Laws, the state's system com-
peted with self-help. Section 74 of the Lombard Laws says that the
price for injuries was raised to discourage the blood-feud (which was
made illegal by section 45).27 If this statement is correct, then the
prices had to be accurate enough to prevent blood-feuds.
Third, this mode of thinking-determining social class by looking
at the price schedules for wrongs-is standard procedure for modern
translators and non-quantitative historians. It is common for histori-
ans to say that one class is higher than another because the prices for
wrongs done to that class are higher.28 Thus, I am not engaging in a
form of reasoning alien to traditional historians. Rather, I am making
such observations more systematic and comparing them statistically
between civilizations. Making these observations more systematic in
one instance allows me to correct the translator's descriptive error.29
Fourth, slave prices at auction or in other records were subject to
enormous variation based on individual differences between slaves
and market changes. These variations were so large that generaliza-
tions are difficult to make from price records.30 Far better for assess-
ing class differences and social distance 3' are legal price schedules
abstracted from individual characteristics, based on unities of time,
place, and situation.
Fifth, ancient law is particularly appropriate for the study of so-
cial classes because, with less egalitarian rhetoric to contend with, the
lawgivers appear mostly unashamed to admit the differing worth of
26. See, e.g., the Hittite Laws, which frequently state that they are revisions of earlier pun-
ishments. RoTH, supra note 4, at 217-25.
27. See THE LOMBARD LAWS 61, 64 (Katherine F. Drew trans., 1973) (sections 45 and 74
discuss the blood-feud).
28. See, e.g., id. at 28-31 (uses the price schedule for wrongs to determine the social class of
different sorts of free men, half-free men, and different sorts of slaves); THE LAW CODE OF
GORTYN 10-14 (Ronald F. Willetts ed. & trans., 1967) (uses the price schedule to determine class
status); O.R. GURNEY, THE HirnTEs 70-72 (1952) (discussing the status of slave class based on
prices for wrongs).
29. See the discussion of the Visigothic Code at Tables 25-26.
30. M.I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 129 (1980); cf. P. ANDER-
SON, PASSAGES FROM ANIourv TO FEUDALISM 76-77 (1974); A.H.M. Jones, Slavery in the
Ancient World, 9 ECON. HIsr. REV. 185 (2d Ser. 1956).
31. I am using a simple intuitive measure of social distance. For more complex formal
measures of social distance in network analysis, see, e.g., RONALD S. BURT, TOWARD A STRUC-
TURAL THEORY OF AcroN 43-47 (1982).
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persons. Thus, some of the hierarchy that would be hidden in modern
societies is explicit in ancient law collections. Some codes, for exam-
ple, the Laws of Hammurabi, have been described as obsessed with
status.3
2
My enterprise is not unlike modem attempts to quantify the
amount of price discrimination on account of race in product markets
(i.e., car-buying 33), but here the prices are laid out in the law collec-
tions, rather than being elicited in prospective market transactions in-
volving closely matched experimental testers. This research design is
also similar to the efforts of modern economists to determine a price
schedule for particular crimes based on time served and the chance of
detection and conviction, 34 but I am restricted to the nominal punish-
ment set out in the law collections. Sometimes these statutory penal-
ties are set so high that they were probably not imposed; rather they
might have served mostly as leverage in a system of bargaining.
If one were to take the frequently challenged view that the an-
cient Near Eastern law collections were binding law codes,35 then they
reflect the views of legislators or redactors. If one instead views them
as the results of legal decisions in court, then these law collections
reflect the valuation of social classes actually imposed by judges-ar-
guably an even more important source of information. If one instead
views the law collections as scientific academic treatises of examples
on how the law was and should be applied, then these valuations re-
flect the views on social stratification of what one might call an an-
cient social scientist. If one instead views the law collections as the
collected wisdom rules of the society, then these valuations reflect the
collected wisdom of the societies from which they spring. Or if one
instead views these law collections as the king's literary attempt to
convince his subjects that he was a just and wise king, then these are
reflections of what the king implicitly views as attractively just valua-
tions of the social classes. In short, denying the binding nature of the
law collections in no way invalidates my undertaking, and indeed may
strengthen it. Because my interest is in the social structure that these
32. See Raymond Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes, 92 REVUE BIBLUQUE 247
(1985).
33. lan Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Morgan 0. Reynolds, Crime Pays, But So Does Imprisonment, National Center
for Policy Analysis, Policy Report No. 149 (Mar. 1990) (Reynolds computes that the discounted
price of a murder is 2.3 years, rape is 3.5 months, robbery is 36 days, burglary is 7 days, and theft
is 2 days).
35. See Klaas R. Veenhof, "In Accordance with the Words of the Stele": Evidence for Old
Assyrian Legislation, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1717 (1995).
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law collections reflect, my analysis does depend on these collections
being reflective of the societies they come from (even if viewed from
the top). But my analysis does not depend on the collections being
binding law or being actually used by judges or litigants.
Cliometric methods can be overused. As long as cliometric meth-
ods are used as an adjunct to other methods and the truth claims are
modest-as mine certainly are here-counting can shed light where
traditional historians would otherwise have only impressions. As am-
biguous and disparate as are the materials that I am examining, they
still provide a method of comparison, a system of relative prices that
can be used to make rough generalizations across ancient societies
and to contrast individual civilizations with others.
II. PROBLEMS WITH COUNTING CLASS DIFFERENCES
The problems with counting class differences in ancient law codes
and collections are significant-and not easily brushed aside. First,
just like other scholars of ancient law, I am at the mercy of fate.
Those codes that have survived by accident may not be representative
of the codes that were promulgated. And societies that promulgated
codes and law collections probably are not representative of all an-
cient societies-they are likely to be more literate, populated, com-
plex, and spread out. Further, those collections that are translated
into English are skewed toward European and Middle Eastern ones,
with the primary Chinese code (the T'ang Code, A.D. 65336) and Japa-
nese code (the Yoro Code, A.D. 71837) still awaiting full translations.
Second, the texts are often unclear, inconsistent, or marred by
omissions. The original drafting is frequently sloppy or obscure. Un-
less class or gender differences are explicitly noted, it is often hard to
know when general language is used whether the statute is, for exam-
ple, speaking about all free persons or a particular class of free per-
sons, or speaking about just men or both men and women. As
Raymond Westbrook has noted, even the meaning of "slave" is un-
clear, for a free dependent of the king might be referred to in some
contexts as his "slave."'38 Meillassoux has argued, "No formal crite-
36. THE T'ANO CODE: VOLUME 1, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 6.
37. See 1 Lu, supra note 7, at 26-32 (excerpts from Yoro Code); MILLER, supra note 7, at 22-
55 (discusses origins and context of Yoro Code of A.D. 718); NIHONGI: CHRONICLES OF JAPAN
FROM TIHE EARLIEST TIMES TO A.D. 697, supra note 7 (excerpts from Yoro Code); 1 TSUNODA,
supra note 7, at 68-80 (excerpts from Yoro Code of A.D. 718).
38. Raymond Westbrook, Slave and Master in Ancient Near Eastern Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1631 (1995); see I.J. Gelb, From Freedom to Slavery 84-85 (1972) [hereinafter From Free-
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rion has been brought to light that permits a categorical distinction
between slaves and all other components. ' 39 Considerable judgment
is often involved in the coding of sections. Should, for example, add-
ons besides the fine be included (e.g., medical expenses, lost wages)?
Third, some translations are less than ideal. Occasionally, I was
able to resolve ambiguities by looking at the original text in the origi-
nal languages, but in most cases I was forced to rely on the translators'
skills.
Fourth, the numbers may understate the real differences between
classes for two reasons. Perhaps like most Western societies today,
the social classes are farther apart than laws would suggest. Also,
some of the largest differences in punishments, such as between a fine
and death, will be excluded from the data because the punishments
are not comparable.
Fifth, the numbers may overstate the real differences between
classes for two reasons. Undoubtedly, I have not included some pro-
visions treating classes the same because I was unsure whether the
section referred to the ordinary free class or to all persons. Also, I
may overstate differences between classes because the laws may not
have been actually applied. Thus, some of the differences may not
have been socially sustainable in practice.40
Sixth, by trying to generalize across two continents and two-and-
a-half millennia, I am inevitably compressing differences between civi-
lizations, rather than illuminating them. By looking at relative values,
I am automatically making comparisons between systems possible and
comprehensible, but this is one of many variations between societies.
The social structure of some societies is made up of only two or three
classes, while others seem to have dozens of fine gradations. Only
some of these subtleties can be captured in summary tables.
Seventh, I have confined myself to codes and law collections.
Only a small part of law is reflected in a code or law collection and
only a small part of a civilization's social structure is reflected in any
part of its laws. Thus, my generalizations about social classes may re-
flect the reality of everyday life or they may not. More likely, the
prices reflected only the lawgiver's evaluations of the worth of
dom to Slavery]; see also, I.J. Gelb, Definition and Discussion of Slavery and Serfdom 283-97
(1979) [hereinafter Definition and Discussion of Slavery and Serfdom].
39. C. MEILLASSOUX, L'ESCLAVAGE EN AFRIoUE PRECOLONIALE 20 (1975) (discussed in
FINLEY, supra note 30, at 69).
40. See infra Table 23 (difference in Lombard Laws between men and women accosted on
the road is so large that it is probably not socially sustainable).
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classes-but this is still an important observer's estimation of a society
by someone who lived in it and promulgated his estimations for others
to see.
Eighth, although it may seem that the data merely count what
they count, for the data to make any sense, the laws must usually treat
crimes against lower classes as less serious (or at least no more seri-
ous) than crimes against higher classes. As you will see, this assump-
tion is not borne out in the Laws of Manu, which are more concerned
with the pollution of the wrongdoer by contact with the lower classes
than with any harm to the victim.41 Thus, the Laws of Manu are ex-
cluded from the summary statistics at the end of this Article. Further,
individual laws may be based on many confounding considerations,
such as a "pedestal effect" for crimes against women,42 the identity of
the person who actually collects the fine, whether the crime is eco-
nomic or dignitary, and so on. Class may interact with other variables
in ways not controlled for.
Last, and most significantly, this Study is limited by my own igno-
rance. It suffers to an extraordinary degree from the most common
problem that comparativists face. No one could be an expert in each
of the civilizations that are covered in this study. Yet I am an expert
in none of them. This fact alone should give a reader pause before
relying too heavily on my findings.
III. METHODOLOGY
My methods were simple. Trying to hold other things constant-
the kind of wrong committed and the class and gender of the wrong-
doer-what penalties were imposed for wrongs against different social
classes or the property or dependents of different social classes? First,
the value of the free class was set at 1. Then the values for other
classes were determined as a percentage of their relative value to that
of the free class. 43 Sometimes my tables describing statutory provi-
sions describe more classes and gradations within classes than I in-
clude in the summary statistics. Sometimes when the punishments are
not comparable, for example, a fine for one class and corporal punish-
ment for another, I excluded them from the tables or summaries. In
my summary statistics, I excluded the king and the palace from the
41. See infra Tables 15-16.
42. See infra Table 23.
43. For any sets of comparative provisions that had no free class to calibrate the values, the
class with the most observations was assigned first, and the other classes were set by comparison
with that class.
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measurements of upper classes or nobility. Even in our day, a head of
state is special, different from other aristocratic groups.
The metric in which the original price was paid was either a par-
ticular weight in metal (most often silver) or money, or occasionally
physical punishment (e.g., the number of lashes). Since my measures
are comparative and relative, it does not matter whether the original
payments were in metal or in money, and I frequently refer loosely to
payments in weighted metal as payments in money.
The classification of social status proved to be even more difficult
than I had imagined. Sometimes provisions made slight differences in
wording such that it was difficult to determine whether the same delict
was being prohibited. Sometimes it was difficult to determine which
social class should be denominated as the fully free one."4 Sometimes
when several levels of free persons or slaves are discussed, it was diffi-
cult to ascertain which is the ordinary slave or free person. When pro-
visions gave directly inconsistent provisions for the same offense
against free persons, those sections were averaged to retain the mean
of 1 for fully free classes.
IV. THE ANCIENT LAW CODES AND COLLECTIONS
A. The Ancient Sumerian Law Collections:
Ur-Namma and Lipit-Ishtar
The earliest recorded law collections are from ancient Mesopota-
mia-the Laws of Ur-Namma (ca. 2100 B.C.) and the Laws of Lipit-
Ishtar (ca. 1930 B.C.). 4 5 Both of the surviving texts are in Sumerian.
The Laws of Ur-Namma (often called Ur-Nammu) come from the city
of Ur in southern Mesopotamia.4 They are attributed to King Ur-
Namma (r. 2112-2095) or his son, King Shulgi (r. 2094-2047). 47
44. For example, in the Laws of Eshnunna and the Laws of Hammurabi, there were two
basic free classes, the Awilum and the Muskenum. See REUVEN YARON, THE LAWS OF
ESHNUNNA 132-62 (2d rev. ed. 1988); Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the
Laws of Hammurabi, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 13 (1995). Since the Muskenum was the lower class,
it might at first glance seem more sensible to assign them the value of 1. Yet often the codes use
the word Awilu to refer to a free man in a form that includes both Muskenum and Awilum. Thus
it would be nonsensical to assign a value of 1 to the Awilum in one section and a higher value to
Awilum in another section. Thus, the Awilum are assigned a value of 1 in all sections and other
classes are measured against Awilum.
45. ROTH, supra note 4, at 13-35 (all the dates of the Mesopotamian law collections are
from Roth); Raymond Westbrook, The Nature and the Origins of the Twelve Tables, in TH.
MAYER-MALY ET AL., ZErrscHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTE (1988).
46. Westbrook, supra note 45, at 84.
47. ROaT, supra note 4, at 13; P. Steinkeller, The Administrative and Economic Organiza-
tion of the Ur III State: The Core and the Periphery, in McG. GIBSON & R.D. BIGGS, THE OR-
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The Laws of Ur-Namma provide that if a man deflowers the vir-
gin wife of a young man, the husband kills the wrongdoer. 48 This is
not self-help, but rather the punishment that might be ordered by a
court after a trial. If a man deflowers a virgin slave woman, the pen-
alty is only five shekels. Because death and a five shekel punishment
are not comparable, this comparison is noted in Table 1, but is not
included in the statistical summary in Table 2.
The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 B.C.) are attributed to King
Lipit-Ishtar (r. 1934-1924) of the First Dynasty of the city of Isin in
southern Mesopotamia.49 Sections d and f provide that if a man
strikes a man's daughter so as to cause a miscarriage, the penalty is
thirty shekels, while if he so strikes a man's slave woman, the penalty
is only five shekels. Thus, if the free class is assumed to be 1, the
ascribed value of the slave class is 5/30ths or 17% of the value ascribed
to the free class.
TABLE 1
LAWS OF UR-NAMMA (ca. 2100 B.C.)
LAWS OF LiPIT-IsH-rAR (ca. 1930 B.C.)
Mesopotamia
Class
Laws Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value
Ur-Namma 6 man deflowers virgin wife of husband
young man kills
wrongdoer
8 virgin slave 5 shekels
woman
Lipit-Ishtar d strikes so as the daughter of 30 shekels 1
to cause a a man
miscarriage
f slave woman 5 shekels 0.167
of a man
GANIZATION OF POWER, ASPECTS OF BUREACRACY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 19-41 (1987);
S.N. Kramer, The Ur-Nammu Law Code: Who Was its Author?, 52 ORIENTALIA NS 453 (1983).
48. Laws of Ur-Namma § 6.
49. RoTH, supra note 4, at 23; Westbrook, supra note 45, at 85.
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TABLE 2
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
LAWS OF LIPIT-ISHTAR (ca. 1930 B.C.)
Sumer (Mesopotamia)
Class Mean Value N
Free 1 1
Slave 0.167 1
B. The Laws of Eshnunna
The Old Babylonian Laws of Eshnunna (ca. 1770 B.C.) come from
the city of the same name in Mesopotamia. Often unattributed, these
rules may have been promulgated by a ruler named Dadusha.50 Writ-
ten in Akkadian,51 they provide for different penalties for the owners
of dogs or oxen who have been previously warned (an ancient version
of the modern one-bite rule), depending upon the status of the victim.
When a dog or an ox kills a free man, the penalty is forty shekels,
while the penalty for killing a slave is only fifteen shekels. Thus, in
Eshnunna slaves are given a higher explicit value (37.5%) than in
Lipit-Ishtar (17%).
TABLE 3
LAWS OF ESHNUNNA (ca. 1770 B.C.)
Mesopotamia
Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value
man with no takes in 2 slave
23 claim v. distress & slave woman
another man causes death women
24 wife or child of capital pun
a commoner
54 ox owner gores to
warned death man 4) shek 1
55 slave 15 shek 0.375
56 dog owner bites &
warned causes death man 40 shek 1
57 _ _ slave 15 shek 0.375
50. RoTn, supra note 4, at 57.
51. Westbrook, supra note 45, at 85.
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TABLE 4
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
LAWS OF ESHNUNNA (ca. 1770 B.C.)
Mesopotamia
Class Mean Value N
Freeman 1 2
Slave 0.375 2
C. The Laws of Hammurabi
The Laws of Hammurabi make up the most famous ancient code
outside of the Bible. The collection was compiled near the end of
Hammurabi's reign (r. 1792-1750 B.C.). 5 2 Hammurabi, the sixth king
in the First Dynasty of Babylon, expanded the empire and organized
its complex government.53 The Laws were copied many times over
the succeeding centuries. 54
The social structure reflected in the Laws of Hammurabi is sub-
ject to much debate.5 5 The three main classes are the awilum, the
muskenum, and the wardum (slaves). Often awilum is used as the un-
marked, indefinite subject to refer to simply a man or person.5 6 At
other times, it is contrasted with the muskenum, reflecting a class dis-
tinction in favor of the awilum. Although one might be tempted to
assign the full free value to the muskenum, thus making the awilum a
form of nobility, awilum in the Laws of Hammurabi and elsewhere is
"usually a term referring to 'man,' 'person,' 'someone,' 'anyone,'
etc."' 57 Thus, here the class awilum is assigned the value of a free man
with full rights, and the lower free class (muskenum) and the slave
class take their values by contrast with the awilum.
52. RoTH, supra note 4, at 71.
53. Id.
54. See Roth, supra note 44.
55. See, e.g., EIN EDIKT DE KONIGS AMMI-SADUOA VON BABYLON (Fritz R. Kraus ed. &
trans., 1958); YARON, supra note 44, at 132-62; Finkelstein, supra note 3; Josef Klima, Im ewigen
Banne der MUSKENUM-Problematik?, 22 ACTA ANTIOUA ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUN-
GARICAE 267 (1974).
56. Occasionally, muskenum seems to be used in the same way. YARON, supra note 44, at
132-62.
57. ROTH, supra note 4, at 8.
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TABLE 5
LAWS OF HAMMURABI (ca. 1750 B.C.)
Bablyon
Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value
8 man steal ox, sheep, belong to temple 30 fold 1.3338_ ma donkey, pig, boat or palace
8 belong to 10 fold 0.444
commoner
man beats distress to kill
116 holding death son of debtor distrainor's
distress son
116 20 shek +
11 slave laloan
197 awilu break the bone awilu break bone
198 commoner 60 shek
199 awilu's slave half value
198 awilu blind the eye commoner 60 shek
196 awilu blind the eye
199 awilu's slave half value
200 awilu knock out tooth awilu knock outown tooth
201 commoner 20 shek
flogged in pub
202 awilu strike the cheek awilu with status assembly withhigher than own 60 stripes of
an ox whip
203 awilu with status 60 shek 1
equal
204 commoner 10 shek 0.167
205 awilu's awilu cut off ear
slave
strike in a brawl
206-207 awilu unintentionally & awilu 30 shek 1
victim dies
208 commoner 20 shek 0.667
209strike & cause to woman awilu 10 shek 1
lose fetus
211 woman 5 shek 0.5
commoner
213 awilu's slave 2 shek 0.2woman
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Table 5 continued
Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value
210 awilu strike & kill (pregnant) wi
________ ~woman awilu kilduhe
(pregnant)
212 woman 30 shek 0.444
commoner
214 (pregnant) 20 shek 0.296
214_ woman slave
constructs defective death to
229 builder house, collapses & householder builder
kills
230 son of kill son of
230_ householder builder
slave of231 householder' give slave
TABLE 6
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
LAWS OF HAMMURABI (ca. 1750 B.C.)
Babylon
Class Mean Value N




The provisions of Hammurabi show a wide range of interesting
patterns. Most noteworthy, the class difference between the awilum
and the muskenum over cheek-slapping is wider than the class
difference for unintentional killing in a brawl.58 The dignitary slight
led to a wider class difference than death. This is both an interesting
finding in itself and a reason to be cautious about generalizations.
Another variable is clearly at work here, making the relative valuation
of classes dependent on the nature of the crime.




The Hittite Laws are from Asia Minor in the 14th-13th century
B.C. On their face, they are revisions of earlier laws. The Hittites fig-
ure prominently in modern discussions of law because they left an
elaborate law collection, as well as a range of treaties. I used an un-
published 1963 translation by Harry A. Hoffner.5 9 The valuation of









Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value for Class)
1 anyone kills in the course woman 4 slaves 1 1
of an argument
man 4 slaves 1 1
2 slave 2 slaves 0.5
3 anyone accidentally kills free man 2 slaves 1 1
free woman 2 slaves 1 1
4 slave 1 slave 0.5
7 anyone blinds or knocks free person 20 shek 1
out tooth
8 male slave 10 shek 0.5 1
female slave 10 shek 0.5 1
11 anyone breaks hand or free man 20 shek 1
foot
12 male slave 10 shek 0.5 1
female slave 10 shek 0.5 1
13 anyone bites off nose free person 40 shek 1
14 male slave 3 shek 0.075 1
female slave 3 shek 0.075 1
15 anyone tears ear free person 12 shek 1
16 male slave 3 shek 0.25 1
female slave 3 shek 0.25 1
59. Harry A. Hoffner, The Laws of the Hittites (1963) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis). A re-
vised version of this translation will appear in RoT-, supra note 4. The most frequently used
translation is an earlier one by Albrecht Goetze in ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS (James B.
Pritchard ed., 3d ed. 1969). My computations reflect the different shekel value given to the
Hittite and Mesopotamian mina.
60. See GutNJEY, supra note 28, at 70-72 (discussing valuation of slave class); E. NEUFELD,
THE HrrrIrE LAWS 119-21 (1951) (discussing social classes).
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Section Actor Action Victim Penalty Value for Class)
17 anyone causes to miscarry free woman 10 shek 1
18 slave woman 5 shek 0.5
24 he at whose hearth a male slave 100 shek
runaway slave is
found
female slave 50 shek 0.5
176b anyone buys craftsman (slave) 10 shek
177 anyone trained bird- 25 shek
handler (slave)
unskilled man 20 shek
(slave)
unskilled woman 20 shek
(slave)
TABLE 8
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
HrriTE LAWS
(ca. 1400 B.C.; revisions of earlier laws)
Central Anatolia (Turkey)




E. The Covenant Code (Torah)
As Raymond Westbrook has noted about the Covenant Code in
Exodus 21-22, "It is impossible to date this code with any certainty,
but it is one of the earliest strata of biblical literature, probably from
the beginning of the first millennium or even the end of the second
millennium [B.C.]. ''61









Section Actor Act Victim Punishment Value for Class)
Exodus ox gores man death to owner 1
21.28-32 to & ox stoneddeath ________ _______
woman death to owner 1
& ox stoned
minor, male death to owner 1
& ox stoned
minor, female death to owner 1
& ox stoned
slave, male 30 shek & ox 1
stoned
slave, female 30 shek & ox 1
stoned
Bernard Jackson notes that one purpose of these sections may have
been to raise the status of otherwise dependent classes-wives, sons,
and daughters. 62 For my purpose here, the noteworthy comparison is
between the killing of a free person-male or female, son or
daughter-and the killing of a slave. The death of a free person leads
to death for both the goring ox and its owner, while the death of a
slave costs only a dead ox and money-thirty shekels.
F. The Code of Gortyn
The great Law Code of Gortyn is the most extensive penal code
surviving from ancient Grecian civilization,63 though it is actually from
one of the major cities of Crete. It probably dates from 480-450 B.c., 64
62. See Bernard S. Jackson, Modelling Biblical Law: The Covenant Code, 70 C.-KENT L.
REV. 1745 (1995).
63. Much is known about Greek law because of historical and literary sources, fragments of
codes, and city constitutions, but Gortyn left the most complete Code. See MICHAEL GAGARIN,
DRAKON AND EARLY ATHENIAN HOMICIDE LAW (1981) (discussion of homicide law fragment);
MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAw (1986) [hereinafter EARLY GREEK LAW] (describing a
range of sources); DouGLAs M. MACDOWELL, ATHENIAN HOMICIDE LAW (1963) (same); RON-
ALD S. STROUD, DRAKON's LAW ON HOMICIDE (1968) (same).
64. See THE LAW CODE OF GORTYN, supra note 28, at 8.
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but is in part considerably older.65 The social structure of Gortyn was
complex and partly obscure.66 At the top were the fully free men who
associated in clans and took their meals in eating clubs-was Gortyn
the Princeton of the eastern Mediterranean? Clubless or clanless men
(apetairoi) were apparently free but without full rights. Serfs and








Section Actor Action Victim (s--stater) Value for Class)
1 whoever leads away freeman 10s 1
before trial
slave 5s 0.5










2 one rape freeman lOos 1 1
freewoman IOOs 1 1
clubless man los 0.1 1
clubless woman ls 0.1 1
male serf 2.5s 0.025 1
female serf 2.5s 0.025 1
rape slavewoman 2s 0.02
belonging to
the home
65. See id.; EARLY GREEK LAW, supra note 63, at 96.
66. See 1 KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 453-64; Ti LAW CODE OF GORTYN,
supra note 28, at 10-17; H.J. Roby, The Twelve Tables of Gortyn, 2 LAW Q. REV. 135 (1886); see
also, I.M. Diakonoff, Slaves, Helots and Serfs in Early Antiquity, 22 AcrA ANTIQUA ACADEMIAE






Section Actor Action Victim (s--stater) Value for Class)
slave rape freeman 200s 1 1
freewoman 200s 1
male rape male serf 5s 0.025 1
householder
(slave)
female serf 5s 0.025 1
one be taken in freewoman not 5Os 1
adultery in her family's
houses
woman of a 10s 0.2
clubless man
slave be taken (in freewoman not 100s 1
adultery) in her family's
houses
slave 5s 0.05






slave child 25s 0.5
TABLE 11




Class Mean value N
Free 1.000 8
Slave 0.295 6
Clubless Person 0.133 3
Serf 0.025 4
Total 21
Note that wrongs to slaves are valued higher than wrongs to serfs or
clubless men. This seeming anomaly perhaps reflects who receives
payment. Although serfs were tied to the land, they had possession of
the houses in which they lived and their contents, could possess cattle
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in their own right, and probably had money to pay fines.67 If the
prices paid for wrongs to clubless men are paid to the men themselves,
while the prices paid for wrongs to slaves are paid to the slave owners,
then a code written by slave owners for the benefit of slave owners
would value wrongs to slaves higher. This is not unlike the situation in
the original United States Constitution, where southern slave owners
wanted a higher value for slaves than northerners since the
southerners planned to appropriate the potential voting power of
southern slaves. Once again, a confounding variable-who receives
the payment-shows its strength.
G. The Twelve Tables
The first Roman code is the Twelve Tables,68 traditionally dated at
451-450 B.C. 69 The origins of the law code have been widely debated,
with some attributing it to a political move by the plebeians and Ray-
mond Westbrook claiming Mesopotamian origins for the provisions. 70
It is more egalitarian than most ancient law collections, but one law
provides that, if anyone knocks out the tooth of a freeman, the pun-
ishment is 300 asses, while the punishment for inflicting the same in-
jury on a slave is half as much.
TABLE 12
TWELVE TABLES (ca. 450 B.C.)
Rome
Section Actor Act Victim Punishment Value
Table VII, anyone knocks out tooth freeman 300 asses 1
Law X
slave 150 asses 0.5
67. See TmE LAW CODE OF GORTYN, supra note 28, at 14-15 (discussing differences between
slaves and serfs and the rights of serfs).
68. 1 KocoUREK & WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 465-68 (old partial translation).
69. See ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW 151 (1987); see id. at 24-27, 68-77 (discussing
Twelve Tables).
70. Westbrook, supra note 45.
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TABLE 13
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES






H. The Laws of Manu
The Laws of Manu are usually dated about 200 years on either
side of the beginning of the Common Era.71 The Hindu caste system
that has continued into modern times72 is set out in a rudimentary
form in the Laws of Manu. Although the laws are mostly religious,
there are many sections on wrongs of various kinds. In the provisions
on sex with women of different classes, there are different punish-
ments depending on the social class of the victim. But the pattern
revealed in Tables 14 & 15 shows that it is not the class of the victim
that matters. Rather, the Laws of Manu are concerned with the pollu-
tion of the wrongdoer. Thus, Table 15 reveals a pattern for punishing
wrongs against different social classes that is directly opposite to that
expected-sex with the lower classes is punished more severely than
sex with the upper classes.
71. THE LAWS OF MANU (Wendy Doniger & Brian K. Smith trans., 1991).
72. See, e.g., Louis DUMONT, HoMo HIERARCHICUS: AN ESSAY ON THE CASTE SYSTEM
(1966) (a careful, one might even say sympathetic, description of the Hindu caste system).
[Vol. 71:149








Section Actor Victim (p=pennies) Value of Class
385 priest unguarded woman 500p 1.0
of the ruling class
385 priest unguarded woman 500p 1.0
of the commoner
class
385 priest woman of the 500p 1.0
servant class
385 priest woman of the 1000p 2.0
lowest castes
(untouchables)
378 priest guarded woman of 500p 0.5 1.0
the priestly class
383 priest guarded woman of 1000p 1.0 2.0
the ruling class
383 priest guarded woman of 1000p 1.0 2.0
the commoner class
376 ruler unguarded woman 1000p 1.0 2.0
of the priestly class
384 ruler unguarded woman head shaved 0.5 1.0
of the ruling class with urine or
500p
382 ruler woman of the 1000p 1.0 2.0
commoner class
383 ruler woman of the 1000p 1.0 2.0
servant class
377 ruler guarded woman of punished like
the priestly class servants or
burnt up in a
grass fire
382 ruler (guarded) woman of 1000p
the commoner class
376 commoner unguarded woman 500p 0.5 1.0
of the priestly class
384 commoner unguarded woman 500p 0.5 1.0
of the ruling class
383 commoner woman of the 1000p 1.0 2.0
servant class
377 commoner guarded woman of punished like
the priestly class servants or
burnt up in a
grass fire




ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
LAWS OF MANU (ca. 100 B.C.)
India
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Note: Class Orders are Reversed from Traditional Order
Class Av. Value N
5. Lowest Castes 2.00 1
4. Servant 1.00 3
3. Commoner 1.00 3
2. Ruler 0.75 4
1. Priest 0.67 3
Total 14
As Table 16 reveals, the coherent way of understanding the sex
provisions of the Laws of Manu is to see them as assessing
punishments by whether the wrongdoer has sex with someone of a
class higher than, equal to, or lower than the wrongdoer. Illegal sex
with members of one's own class is the least serious; sex with an
upper-class woman is a more serious wrong; and sex with a lower-class
woman is the most serious sex offense.
TABLE 16
PUNISHMENT VALUES FOR SEX WITH DIFFERENT CLASSES
LAWS OF MANU (ca. 100 B.C.)
India
Sex With Different Classes Av. Value of Punishment N
Sex With Lower Class 2.00 5
Sex With Higher Class 1.33 3
Sex With Same Class 1.00 2
Total 10
Because the Laws of Manu are based on a different organizing
principle than the other laws, they are excluded from the final totals at
the end of this Article.
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I. The Burgundian Laws
The Burgundians, one of the many Germanic tribes that con-
quered parts of the former Roman Empire, settled in southeast Gaul.
King Gundobad promulgated the Lex Gundobada in Latin about A.D.
483.73 Additions made through about A.D. 532 are included in Table
17. Like many of the Germanic codes, the laws were written in Latin.
Although a subject of long dispute, most commentators believe that
the Germanic codes are made up of a large dose of traditional Ger-
manic customary law, mixed with Roman-influenced law.74 The closer
the proximity to Rome, the greater the supposed influence of Roman
law.
The Burgundian Laws are based on the traditional Germanic
wergeld.75 The wergeld is often not clearly laid out, rather it can be
inferred from other provisions that base their penalties on the wer-
geld. As in other law collections, coding was a problem. Sometimes
the Burgundians lumped the free classes together; at other times, they
split them into the lower, middle, and upper free classes.
TABLE 17
BURGUNDIAN LAWS
Lex Gundobada (ca. A.D. 483-532)
Southeast Gaul
Punishment
Section Actor Act Victim (s=solidi) Value
p19-20n4 wergeld ordinary slave 30s




p19-20n6 wergeld slave 40s
carpenter
p19-20n7 wergeld slave 50s
blacksmith
p19-20n8 wergeld slave 100s
silversmith
p19-20n9 wergeld slave 200s
goldsmith











Section Actor Act Victim (s=solidi) Value
p19-20n11 wergeld royal agent 150s
(steward)(unfree)





II, 2 anyone kills after being anyone half




middle class lOOs 1.333
lower class 75s I
V,1 anyone strikes with such native Is/blow & I
presumption (V is freeman 6s fine
titled "Of Those
Who Strike Others
With Lash or Rod,
With a Kick, or
With a Blow of
the Fist")
V,2 whoever strikes another's .5s/blow & 0.643
freedman 4s fine
V,3 another's .333sfblow 0.476
slave & 3s fine
V,6 slave strikes with a blow native 100 blows
of his fist freeman
V,4 anyone seizes hair native 4s & 6s
violently with two freeman fine
hands
V,5 whoever freedman .5s/blow & 0.45
4s fine
another's .333s/blow 0.333
slave & 3s fine
V,4 anyone seizes hair native 2s & 6s 1
violently with one freeman fine
hand
V,5 whoever freedman .5s/blow & 0.563
4s fine
another's .333s/blow 0.417
slave & 3s fine









X,5 slave 40s 0.267
carpenter
X,4 slave 50s 0.333
blacksmith
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Table 17 continued
Punishment
Section Actor Act Victim (s--solidi) Value
X,3 slave 10Os 0.667
silversmith
X,2 slave 200s 1.333
goldsmith
11,2 wergeld freeman 150S 1
(implicitly) (lower class)
11,2 wergeld freeman 200s 1.333
(implicitly) (middle class)
11,2 wergeld freeman 300s 2(implicitly) (nobility)
L,1 native free unneccesarily an agent 150s






XXVI,1 anyone by chance strikes Burgundian 15s 3
out the teeth of the highest
class or
Roman noble





XXVI,3 persons of 5s 1
the lowest
class
XXVI,5 native strikes out the freedman 3s 0.6
freeman tooth
XXVI,6 another's 2s 0.4
slave
XXXII,1 native binds an innocent 12s & 12s I
freeman native fine
freeman
XXXII,2 freedman 6s & 6s 0.5
fine
XXXI,3 slave 3s & 3s 0.25
fine
XXXIII,1 native cuts off hair & native 12s & 12s 1
freeman humiliates without freewoman fine
cause
XXXIII,2 freedwoman 6s [& 6s 0.5
fine?]
XXXIII,3 maidservant 3s & 3s 0.25
fine
XXXIII,4 slave cuts off hair & native 200 blows 1
humiliates without freewoman
cause




Section Actor Act Victim (s-solidi) Value
_XXXIII_ maidservant 75 blows 0.375
XCII,1 native cut off her hair in native 30s to the 1
freeman her courtyard freewoman woman &
12s fine




ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
BURGUNDIAN LAWS
Lex Gundobada (ca. A.D. 483-532)
Southeast Gaul
Class Mean Value N
Free Nobility 2.333 3
Free Middle Class 1.556 3




In the Burgundian Laws, slaves were valued at 35% of free, and
freed slaves were valued at 54% of free. The upper-class free were
valued at 2.3 times the value of the ordinary free class. Note,
however, that the wergeld for a slave goldsmith was 200 solidi-equal
to a middle-class free person and above a lower-class free person (150
solidi).
J. Laws of the Franks
In Gaul, the Germanic King Clovis consolidated the Salian and
the Ripuarian Franks into a single kingdom.76 He then issued a code
of laws for the combined kingdom in about A.D. 507-511, usually
called the Pactus Legis Salicae (Pact of Salic Law). 77 This Pact was
76. See THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS 4-9 (Katherine F. Drew trans., 1991); LAWS OF
THE SALIAN AND RIPUARIAN FRANKS, supra note 9, at 2-3.
77. LAWS OF THE SALIAN AND RIPUARIAN FRANKS, supra note 9, at 3.
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originally set out in Latin in sixty-five titles. My analysis is based on
this earliest version of the code, without later Christian revisions and
additions.
TABLE 19
LAWS OF THE FRANKS
Pactus Legis Salicae (ca. A.D. 507-511)
Gaul
Penalty Class Gender
Section Actor Action Victim (d=denarii) Value Value
X,1 he steals male slave 1400d + return/ 0.175 1.000
value + time
use
X,I he steals female slave 1400d + return/ 0.175 1.000
value + time
use
X,4 he female slave 1200d + return/ 0.150 0.857
value + time
use
X,6 he loses female slave 2800d + return/ 0.350
(steals worth 15 or 25s value + time
and sells) use
swineherd 2800d + return/ 0.350
worth 25s value + time
use
vine dresser 2800d + return/ 0.350
worth 25s value + time
use
metal worker 2800d + return/ 0.350
worth 25s value + time
use
miller worth 2800d + return/ 0.350
25s value + time
use
carpenter 2800d + return/ 0.350
worth 25s value + time
use
groom worth 2800d + return/ 0.350
25s value + time
use
X,7 he steals young male 1400d + return/ 0.175 1.000





Section Actor Action Victim (d=denarii) Value Value
X,7 he young female 1400d + return/ 0.175 1.000
household value + time
slave use?
X,3 he steals or male slave 1400d + return/ 0.175
kills or value + time
sells or use
sets free
XXXV,9 he steals or male household 3,000d + return/ 0.375 1.000
kills slave value + time
use
female house- 3,000d + return/ 0.375 1.000
hold slave value + time
use
ironsmith 3,000d + return/ 0.375
value + time
use
goldsmith 3,000d + return/ 0.375
value + time
use
swineherd 3,000d + return/ 0.375
value + time
use
vintner 3,000d + return/ 0.375
value + time
use
stablehand 3.000d + return/ 0.375
value + time
use
XXI V,1 he kills free boy S 12 24,000d 3.000 1.000
XXIV,4 long-haired boy 24,OOOd 3.000 1.000
XLI,18 long-haired boy 24,000d 3.000 1.000
LXVe,2 girl S 12 8,000d 1.000 0.333
XLI,15 free girl before 8,000d 1.000 0.333
she is able to
bear children








LXVe,1 boy fetus 24,000d 3.000 2.250
XLI,20 (female) infant 4,000d 0.500 0.375
in womb or
newborn
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Table 19 continued
Penalty Class Gender
Section Actor Action Victim (d=denarii) Value Value








LXVe,3 woman <60 24,000d 3.000 3.000
able to bear
children
LXVe,1 pregnant 24,000d 3.000 3.000
woman
XLI,19 pregnant 24,000d 3.000 3.000
woman
XXIV,9 free woman 8,000d 1.000 1.000
after she is no
longer able to
bear children








XLI,5 man in the 24,000d 3.000
king's trust









XLI,10 Roman who 2500d 0.313
pays tribute
LIV,1 count 24,000d 3.000
LIV,2 sagibaron or 12,000d 1.500
count who is a
servant of the
king
LIV,3 sagibaron who 24,000d 3.000
is a freeman
XIV,1 he robs by freeman 2500d 1.000
waylaying
XIV,2 Roman Salic barbarian ordeal of boil-
ing water or
2500d
XIV,3 Frank robs Roman 1200d 0.480
XXXV,5 freeman robs another man's 1400d + return 0.560





Section Actor Action Victim (d=denarii) Value Value
XXXV,2 attacks & another man's 1200d + return 0.480
robs slave + took of prop + time
>40d lost
XXXV,3 another man's 600d + return 0.240
slave + took of prop + time
<40d lost
XLI,2 throws in free Frank or 24,000d 1.000
a well other barbarian
living by Salic
law
XLI,6 man in the 72,000d 3.000
king's trust
XXIV,2 he cuts the long-haired 1800d 1.000
hair free boy
XXIV,3 free girl 1800d 1.000
XXV,1 freeman has inter- someone else's 600s 1.000
course slave girl
XXV,2 King's slave 1200s 2.000
girl
XXXI,1 he blocks freeman 600d 1.000 1.000
the road
or strikes
XXXI,2 free woman 1800d 3.000 3.000
XXXII,1 he ties up freeman 1200d 1.000
without
cause
XXXII,3 Roman Frank 1200d
XXXII,4 Frank Roman 600d 0.500
LXIV,1 he calls a another man 2500d 1.000
sorcerer
LXIV,2 calls a free woman 7500d 3.000
witch




LXVf,2 servant 15s for time lost 0.500
LXVf,2 freedman 15s for time lost 0.500
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TABLE 20
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
LAWS OF THE FRANKS
Pactus Legis Salicae (ca. A.D. 507-511)
Gaul








More clearly than other Germanic codes, the Salian Frankish
laws assigned a specific and quite low valuation on Romans.78 Their
78. In societies where being part of a family or clan is an important part of survival and
foreigners are treated as lower-class citizens, exile or a loss of citizenship is a significant
punishment. In both Germanic and ancient Near Eastern societies, "The kin group was
important because the individual alone, or even with his immediate family, was in a precarious
position .. " THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS, supra note 76, at 40 (statement by Katherine
Fischer Drew). Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1639, uses similar language to describe the ancient
Near East: "Foreigners in the ancient Near East were in a precarious situation. They had no
legal rights outside of their own country or ethnic group unless they fell under the local rulers'
protection." First, the hardships of shelter, protection from enemies, and food meant that
pooling resources could reduce the chance of starvation and other causes of death. But legally, a
kin group was crucial as well. One needed a kin group to bring suits and to pay damages. In
many systems, such as Frankish law, offenses could be defended or prosecuted procedurally only
by having large numbers of oathhelpers to testify in court. THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS,
supra note 76, at 40.
The Laws of Hammurabi (Mesopotamia, ca. 1750 B.C.) provide for banishment from the city
for incest with a daughter. RoT, supra note 4, at 110 (§ 154). The brief surviving excerpt from
an Athenian law collection, Drakon's Law of Homicide (Athens, ca. 409-408 B.C. inscription of
laws attributed to 621-620 B.c.), provides, "Even if someone kills someone without
premeditation, he shall be exiled." STROUD, supra note 63, at 6. The Welsh Laws of Hywel
DDA (Wales, ca. 928-1200) provide for banishment for an accessory to theft who is unable to pay
the fine, though the lord who banishes the wrongdoer may settle for a token payment. TIE LAW
OF HYWEL DDA, supra note 9, at 157-59.
The Spartans sometimes revoked citizenship for wrongdoers. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL,
SPARTAN LAW 148-49 (1986). The Athenians sometimes imposed perpetual exile for homicide.
MACDOWELL, supra note 63, at 110 (quoting Demosthenes), 113. The Chinese criminal code,
the T'ang Code (A.D. 653), has elaborate provisions on exile. Exile for life could be at three
distances, depending on the intended seriousness of the punishment. THE T'ANG CODE:
VOLUME 1, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 6. All three distances required a year of labor, but
three years of labor could also be ordered. Johnson, supra note 6, at 220 n.24. Further, exile
could be redeemed by the payment of 120-130 pounds of copper. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
value was only 45% of the value of free Franks. Slaves, however,
were valued at only 27% of free persons.
K. Alamannic Laws
The first redaction of the Alamannic laws was the Pactus Legis
Alamannorum (Pact of Alamannic Law) promulgated during the
reign of Chlotar II (r. A.D. 584-629). The Alamans lived in the middle
and upper Rhine and were allied with the Franks. Again, the original
text was in Latin.
TABLE 21
ALAMANNIC LAWS
Pactus Legis Alamannorum (ca. A.D. 584-629)





Section Actor Action Victim (s--solidi) Value for Gender) for Class)
11 anyone strikes freewoman 2s 2.00 1.00 2
freedwoman 1.333s 1.33 0.67
maidservant ls 1.00 0.50 2
man Is 1.00 1.00 1
slave (male) .5s 0.50 0.50 1
XIV anyone accuses of freewoman 80s 1.00 1.00
witchcraft or
poisoning &
puts her in a
hurdle
maidservant 15s 0.19 0.19
anyone accuses of freewoman 40s 1.00 1.00
witchcraft or
poisoning &




maidservant 15s 0.38 0.38
XIV man kill a sup- lower class 320s 1.00 1.00
posed witch woman
middle class 400s 1.25 1.25
woman










Section Actor Action Victim (s--solidi) Value for Gender) for Class)
XVI1 freeman kills freeman 40s 1.00 1.00 1
freedman 13.333s 0.33 033 1.000
slave 12s 0.30 0.30 1
free Ala- 80s 2.00 1.00 2
mannic
woman
freedwoman 26.667s 0.67 0.33 2.000
maidservant 12s 0.30 0.15 1
XVII1 waylayers blocks the way freeman 6s 1.00 1.00 1
(or waylays)
freedman 4s 0.67 0.67 1.000
slave 3s 0.50 0.50 1
free Ala- 12s 2.00 1.00 2
mannic
woman
freedwoman 8s 1.33 0.67 2.000
maidservant 4s 0.67 0.33 1.333












The Alamannic Laws show a wide difference between the prices
for wrongs to different classes. Higher class free persons were valued
at 6.75 times the value of the basic free class, while slaves were valued
at 36% of free persons. Freed slaves were valued at only 53% of the
value of free persons, closer to slavery than to freedom.
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TABLE 22




Middle and Upper Rhine
(France and Germany)
Mean Value (Controlling
Class for Gender) N
Higher Class Free 6.750 2
Middle Class Free 3.625 2




L. The Lombard Laws
The Lombard Laws were promulgated by King Rothair in A.D.
643 in a code usually called Rothair's Edict.79 The Lombards had
moved from central Europe at the end of the fifth century to Italy in
568 under the leadership of Alboin, replacing the Byzantines. 80 By
584, most of Italy had been conquered. Rothair, Duke of Brescia,
promulgated his code in A.D. 643.81 Like almost all of the Germanic
codes, the Lombard Laws were written in Latin.
The Lombard Laws have the most extensive price schedule of
any of the codes examined in this Article. This code breaks down the
loss of each finger and each toe, with different prices for a free man,
an aldius (half-free man), a household slave, and a free slave.
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TABLE 23
LOMBARD LAWS





(s=solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)
26 anyone places himself in free 900s AC (as corn- 1.000 45.000
the road before woman position) (half to
victim, or inflicts King, half to vic-
some injury tim or victim's
upon her guardian) 1
26 anyone places himself in free girl 900s AC (half to
the road before King, half to vic-
victim, or inflicts tim or victim's
some injury guardian)
upon her
26 blocks the road, freeman 20s AC + corn-
and causes pensation for
injury injuries by sched-
ule RE 43-128
27 blocks the road, freeman 20s AC 1.000 1.000
provided no
physical injury
28 anyone blocks the road man slave 20s AC to lord 1.000 1.000
to victim
28 anyone blocks the road woman 20s AC to lord 0.022 1.000
to victim slave
28 freedman 20s AC to lord 1.000
47 he who hits on the head another 12s AC-one bone; 1.000
so that bones man 24-2 bones; 36s-
are broken 3+ bones
79 strikes on the aldius 4s AC + work 0.333
head so that one lost + DRs fee
or more bones
are broken




103 strikes on the field slave (3s AC-1+ blows) 0.250
head so that + work lost +
bone is broken DRs fee (possibly
plus Is for 1 blow
& 2s for 2+ blows
48 someone gouges out V's another half wergeld AC
eye man













(s--solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)




49 he who cuts off nose another half wergeld AC
man
82 aldius 8s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
82 household 8s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
106 field slave 4s AC + work 0.181
lost + DRs fee
50 he who cuts off lip another 16s AC: w teeth 1.000
man exposed 20s AC
84 cuts off lip so aldius 4s AC + work 0.200
that teeth lost + DRs fee
exposed
84 household 4s AC + work 0.200
slave lost + DRs fee
108 field slave 3s AC 0.150
51 he who knock's out another 16s AC / tooth 1.000
front tooth man
85 aldius 4s AC / tooth 0.250
85 household 4s AC / tooth 0.250
slave
109 field slave 2s AC / tooth 0.125
52 he who knock's out implicitly: 8s AC / tooth 1.000
molars another
mnan's
86 aldius 2s AC / tooth 0.250
86 household 2s AC / tooth 0.250
slave
109 field slave Is AC / tooth 0.125
53 he who cuts off ear another 1/4th wergeld
man
83 aldius 2s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
83 household 2s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
107 field slave 2s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
54 he who strikes & another 16s AC 1.000
wounds face man
80 strikes on face aldius 2s AC 0.125
80 household 2s AC 0.125
slave
104 wounds field slave Is AC 0.063
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(s=solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)
62 he who cuts off hand another 1/2 wergeld AC
man
88 aldius half the value
(pretium) AC




113 field slave half the value
_pretium) AC
63 he who cuts off thumb another 1/6 wergeld AC
man
89 aldius 8s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
89 household 8s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
114 field slave 4s AC 0.181
64 he who cuts off index another 16s AC 1.000
finger man
90 aldius 6s AC 0.375
90 household 6s AC 0.375
slave
115 field slave 3s AC 0.188
65 he who cuts off middle another 5s AC 1.000
finger man
91 aldius 2s AC 0.400
91 household 2s AC 0.400
slave
116 field slave Is AC 0.200
66 he who cuts off ring fin- another 8s AC 1.000
ger man
92 aldius 2s AC 0.250
92 household 2s AC 0.250
slave
117 field slave Is AC 0.125
67 he who cuts off little fin- another 16s AC 1.000
ger man





(s--solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)
93 household 4s AC 0.250
slave
118 field slave 2s AC + work
lost + DRs fee
68 he who cuts off foot another 1/2 wergeld AC
man
95 aldius half the value
(pretium) AC
95 household half the value
slave (pretium) AC
119 field slave half the value
(pretium) AC 1
69 he who cuts off big toe another 16s AC 1.000
man
96 aldius 4s AC + work 0.381
lost + DRs fee
96 household 4s AC + work 0.381
slave lost + DRs fee
120 field slave 2s AC 0.125
70 he who cuts off 2d toe another 6s AC 1.000
man
97 aldius 2s AC 0.333
97 household 2s AC 0.333
slave
121 field slave Is AC 0.167
71 he who cuts off 3d toe another 3s AC 1.000
man
98 aldius Is AC 0.333
98 household Is AC 0.333
slave
122 field slave Is AC 0.333
72 he who cuts off 4th toe another 3s AC 1.000
man
99 aldius Is AC 0.333
99 household Is AC 0.333
slave
123 field slave .5s AC 0.167
73 he who cuts off 5th toe another 2s AC 1.000
man
100 aldius Is AC 0.500
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(s--solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)
100 household Is AC 0.500
slave
124 field slave .5 AC 0.250
87 he who breaks arm aldius 6s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
87 household 6s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
101 he who wounds on the aldius 6s AC + work 0.361
chest lost + DRs fee
101 household 6s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
111 field slave 3s AC + work 0.181
lost + DRs fee
102 he who puncturing arm aldius 3s AC + work 0.361
or leg lost + DRs fee
102 household 3s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
110 field slave 2s AC + work 0.241
lost + DRs fee
102 he who strikes arm or aldius Is AC (prob. + 0.361
leg without work lost + DRs
puncturing fee)
102 household Is AC (prob. + 0.361
slave work lost + DRs
fee)
110 field slave Is AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
87 he who breaks arm aldius 6s AC + work 0.723
lost + DRs fee
87 household 3s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
112 field slave 3s AC + work 0.361
lost + DRs fee
94 he who breaks hip or aldius 6s AC + work 0.723
shin bone lost + DRs fee
94 household 3s AC + work 0.361
slave lost + DRs fee
112 he who breaks hip or field slave 3s AC + work 0.361
leg lost + DRs fee
129 he who kills aldius 60s AC 0.381









(s--solidi; AC=as ling for ling for
Section Actor Act Victim composition) Gender) Class)





132 tenant 20s AC 0.127
slave

































201 girl 1200s AC(free?)
201 free 1200s AC
woman
14 anyone secretly kills freeman 900s (combined) 1.000(1 or 2
persons)
14 woman 900s (combined) 1.000
slave
14 man slave 900s (combined) 1.000 1.000
14 anyone native- wergeld, accord-(more born free- ing to his rank
than 2) man (each killer pay-
ing total)
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(s-solidi; AC=as ling for ling for















206 freedwo- 20s AC 0.361
man
207 female 20s AC 0.361
slave
208 anyone blocks way of aldius 40s AC (half to 0.723
owner or guard- king, half to
ian retrieving owner)
stolen
209 woman 20s AC (half to 0.361
slave king, half to
owner)
194 man has intercourse native 20s AC 0.361
woman
slave
Roman 12s AC 0.217
woman
slave
383 anyone in a quarrel freeman 6s AC 1.000
drags by beard
or hair
slave same as 1 blow 0.167
1 (is AC)
aldius same as 1 blow 0.167
. I (is AC)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
TABLE 24






Class Mean Value N
Free 1.000 18
Freed Slave 0.681 2
Aldius (Half-Free) 0.381 27
Slave & House Slave 0.361 30
House Slave 0.329 23
Field Slave 0.214 21
Total 98
As in the antebellum American South, field slaves (21% of free)
were of a lower class and value than house slaves (33% of free). The
class of half-free persons (aldius) were little higher than slaves-38%
to 36%. Freed slaves were valued at 68% of the value of free persons.
This low valuation of freed slaves reflects the observation of historical
sociologists that freed slaves were usually dependent classes, tied to
their former masters.82
M. The Visigothic Code
The Visigoths, who settled in Spain, may have been the first Ger-
manic tribe to write a code of laws. The first code dates back to A.D.
476, but it survives only in the revised version promulgated about A.D.
654. Unlike most codes, the Visigothic Code valued the class of freed
slaves even lower than the class of slaves. Slaves were valued at 47%
of free persons, while freed slaves were valued at only 33% of free
persons. Once again, this anomaly suggests that who actually col-
lected payment for the wrong may have affected the price to be paid.
82. See PArrERSON, supra note 16, at 240-61.
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(ca. A.D. 654, based on codes





Penalty Class ling for
Section Actor Action Victim (s=solidi) Value Class)
Bk.Vl,tit.lll,s.4 anyone cause, by blow or freeborn 200s 1.33
otherwise, to abort woman
a fully formed fetus
cause, by blow or freeborn lOos 0.67
otherwise, to abort woman
a fetus not fully
formed
Bk.Vl,tit.lll,s.4 freeborn produces abortion female 20s 0.13
man slave
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.1 freeborn strikes on head & another 5s 1.00
person causes bruise freeborn
person
slave of 2.5s 0.50
another
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.1 freeborn strikes on head & another lOs 1.00
person breaks skin freeborn
person
slave of 5s 0.50
another
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.1 freeborn strikes on head & another 20s 1.00
person causes wound freeborn
extending to the person
bone
slave of ls 0.50
another
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.1 freeborn strikes on head & another 10Os 1.00
person breaks a bone freeborn
person
slave of 5Os 0.50
another
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 culprit strikes and destroys freeman lOOs 1.00
the nose
person freedman 33.33s 0.33
born free
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) injury to the loins freeman lOOs 1.00







Penalty Class ling for
Section Actor Action Victim (s--solidi) Value Class)
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 whoever cuts off or destroys freeman 100s 1.00
the use of a hand
person freedman 33.33s 0.33
born free
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of thumb freeman 5Os 1.00
person freedman 16.67s 0.33
born free
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of forefinger freeman 40s 1.00
person freedman 13.33s 0.33
born free
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of middle finger freeman 30s 1.00
person freedman 10s 0.33
born free
Bk.Vl,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of fourth finger freeman 20s 1.00
person freedman 6.67s 0.33
born free
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of fifth finger freeman los 1.00
person freedman 3.33s 0.33
born free
Bk.Vi,tit.IV,s.3 (whoever) loss of tooth by vio- freeman 12s/tooth 1.00
lence
person freedman 4s/tooth 0.33
born free
Bk.VI,tit.IV,s.3 whoever breaks the leg & freeman pound of gold 1.00
renders lame
person freedman .33 pound of 0.33
born free _gold
Bk.VItit.Vs.3 one man push another with- (freeman) pound of gold 1.00
out malice, causing
the person pushed
to kill a third party
by accident
Bk.Vl,tit.V,s.9 freeman kill by accident (as slave .5 pound of 0.50
above) _gold
Bk.VIl,tit.llI,s.2 freeman kidnap male slave 100 lashes & 4 1
persons (slaves)
of the same sex
female 100 lashes & 4 1
slave persons (slaves)
of the same sex
Bk.VII,tit.lIIs.3 anyone kidnap son of a delivered to 1












Penalty Class ling for
Section Actor Action Victim (s--solidi) Value Class)
daughter of delivered to






Bk.V,tit.IV,s.11 anyone sell or give away male free- 100s of gold (or




female free- 100s of gold (or




Bk.Vtit.IVs.l1 slave sell or give away male free- 200 lashes,
born person scalping, and
perpetual servi-
tude
female free- 201 lashes,
born person scalping, and
perpetual servi-
tude
Bk.III,tit.IIl,s.8 slave carries off by force freewoman scalped & 300 1.00
lashes
Bk.IlItit.Il,s.10 carries off by force female head shaved & 0.67
slave of 200 lashes
another I I
TABLE 26
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
VISIGOTHIC CODE
Legis Visigothorum
(ca. A.D. 654, based on codes back to A.D. 476)
Spain






Incredibly, S.P. Scott, the translator of the Visigothic Code,
claims:
The Visigoths were different from other barbarians, in that, in
legislation and the management of their civil affairs, they mani-
fested a sense of humanity, and a genuine philosophy, rarely to be
found even among nations that are thoroughly civilized.... Under
their system all persons were equal before the law.... The punish-
ment for crime was graded according to the wealth of the offender,
rather than according to the rank and station of the party injured.8 3
As to the humanity of the Visigoths, the pervasiveness of debt slavery
and the vicious provisions against Jews tend to undercut Scott's con-
clusions. But his statement about the punishment of crime not being
based on the rank of the victim is simply false, as Tables 25 and 26
amply illustrate.
N. Early English Law Collections
The early British law collections are perhaps the earliest surviving
works written in Old English and the only early Germanic codes not
written in Latin. The most extensive of the early law collections are
the Laws of Alfred (ca. A.D. 885-899), but these date from after
Charlemagne and are thus excluded from this Study. King
Aethelberht of Kent in southern England probably promulgated his
laws about A.D. 602-603.84 A later, less detailed law collection was
attributed to the Kentish kings Hlothhere and Eadric (ca. A.D. 673-
86).85
83. THE VISIGOTrHIC CODE XiX (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1910) (Scott goes on to discuss slaves
in a way inconsistent with this statement, but discusses freed slaves without directly undercutting
his incorrect generalizations).
84. See F.L. ATrENBOROUGH, Ti LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 2-61 (1922);
DOROTHY WHITLOCK, ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 391-407 (2d ed. 1979). The versions
of the early Kentish laws are preserved only in a much later 12th century manuscript. Some
revisions and modernizations of language apparently occurred. A'rENBOROUGH, supra, at 3.
85. See AT'ENBOROUGH, supra note 84, at 2-61; WImTLOCK, supra note 84, at 391-407.
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TABLE 27
LAWS OF AETHELBERHT (ca. A.D. 602-603)
LAWS OF HLOTHHERE AND EADRIC (ca. A.D. 673-86)
LAWS OF INE (ca. A.D. 688-694)




Laws Section Actor Action Victim (s-schilling) Value Class)
Aethelberht 10 man lies with maiden (slave) 50s
beloning to the
mig
11 maiden grinding 25s
slave belonging to
the king
maiden of the 12s
third class (slave)
belongInngto the
16 man lies with commoner's serv- 6s
ing maid
11 slave of the 2d 2.5s
class
maiden of the 1.5s
third class (slave)
21 man slays another man 100s (ordinary 1.000
wergeld)
25 dependent of a 6s 0.060
commoner
26 laet of the best 80s 0.800
class
laet of 2d class 60s 0.600
laet of 3d class 40s 0.400
12 fedesl belonging to 20s 0.200
the king,
24 man lays bonds freeman 20s 1.000
88 another man's ser- 6s 0.300
vant
74 [for injury] unmarried woman same as free-
man








Laws Section Actor Action Victim (s=schilling) Value Class)
75 violation widow of the best 50s






widow of the 2d 20s
class
widow of the 3d 12s
class
widow of the 4th 6s
class
Hlothhere 1 man's slays nobleman with a surrender the 3.000
& Eadric servant wergeld of 300s homicide and
pay the value
of 3 slaves
3 freeman with a surrender the 1.000
wergeld of 100s homicide and
pay the value
of I slave
Ine 23 s.3 man wergeld welsh taxpayer 120s 2.000
son of a welsh tax- 100s 1.667
payer
24 s.2 Welshman with 5 600s 10.000
hides of land
32 Welshman with a 120s 2.000
hide of land
Welshman with 80s 1.333
half a hide of land
Welshman with no 60s 1.000
land
Welsh horseman in 200s 3.333
the King's service
killing slave 60s (or 50s)
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TABLE 28
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES
EARLY ENGLISH LAWS
(ca. A.D. 602-694)
Saxon Kingdoms in Southern England






The relative differences in valuation within the slave class are
huge, from 1.5 schillings for a man who lies with a third-class slave
maiden to fifty schillings for doing the same to a maiden slave of the
king. There are similar elaborate, wide differentiations for killing
different persons from dependent classes (from six schillings to eighty
schillings). For violating the guardianship of a widow, one again sees
multiple classes (four classes of widow) and multiple punishments
(from six schillings to fifty schillings).
In the Laws of Ine (ca. A.D. 688-694), from the West Saxon
kingdom of Wessex, the wergeld of different classes of free Welsh
landowners is laid out and contrasted with the wergeld of a free
Welshman with no land. These laws are known because they were
attached to the Laws of Alfred. Thus, the Laws of ne were probably
slightly revised and may not be complete.
Overall, in the early British law collections, slaves are valued at
30% of free, freed slaves at 60% of free, and the nobility at 6.5 times
the value of the basic free class.
V. THE VALUES OF SOCIAL CLASSES
Ancient law systems explicitly treated wrongs against slaves as
less serious than wrongs against free persons. Tables 29-31 tell the
story. The range of slave values for the ordinary slave is surprisingly
narrow-17% to 50%, with a mean of 33%. The outliers among sys-
tems are Lipit-Ishtar and the Roman Twelve Tables, which are based
on only one observation each. Thus, if systems with only one observa-
tion were excluded, the range would be even narrower-25% to 47%.
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TABLE 29
ASCRIBED VALUES OF CLASSES IN ANCIENT LAW
2100 B.C. - A.D. 700
Laws Nobility Free Freed Half-Free Slave
Value N Value N Value N Value N Value N
Romans 1 1 0.50 1
Visigoths 1 18 0.33 10 0.47 7
Hittites 1 7 0.38 11
Eshnunna 1 2 0.38 2
Alamans 6.75 2 1 10 0.53 5 0.36 8
Burgundians 2.33 3 1 10 0.54 7 0.35 9
Lombards 1 18 0.68 27 0.38 27 0.30 51
Saxons 6.50 2 1 3 0.60 3 0.30 1
Gortyn 1 8 0.29 10
Franks 3.00 4 1 5 0.50 1 0.56 1 0.27 11
Hammurabi 1 3 0.25 2
Lipit-Ishtar 1 1 0.17 1
Mean 4.65 11 1 86 0.53 28 0.47 28 0.33 114
(unweighted) _ I
TABLE 30
ASCRIBED VALUES OF SLAVES IN ANCIENT LAW







0.40 035 036 038 038
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TABLE 31
ASCRIBED VALUES OF FREED SLAVES AND HALF-FREE
PERSONS IN ANCIENT LAW









0.10 , -' U ~ -
, o _' *-
0.0.
Consistent with the findings of historians of slavery, 86 the valua-
tions of freed slaves and half-free persons are very low, barely above
that of slaves. Freed slaves were typically dependent classes, expected
to stay close to their former masters. 87 As Tables 29 and 31 show, the
mean value of freed slaves was 53%, while the mean value of half-free
persons was 47%.
86. See PArrERsoN, supra note 16, at 240-61 (describing the degraded status, both socially




RELATIVE VALUES OF CLASSES
IN ANCIENT LAW CODES AND COLLECTIONS
2100 B.C. - A.D. 700
I-
I-
As Tables 29 and 32 illustrate, the upper classes (excluding the
king) are valued on average at 4.65 times the value of the ordinary
free classes. This is uncannily similar to modern American views of
the proper salary difference between low prestige jobs (e.g., unskilled
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workers) and high prestige jobs (e.g., corporate C.E.O.s and cabinet
officials).8
VI. COMMODIFICATION-THE FIRST 3,000 YEARS
One of the standard complaints about capitalism is that it com-
modifies human beings. As Peggy Radin explains:
Universal noncommodification holds that the hegemony of
profit-maximizing buying and selling stifles the individual and social
potential of human beings through its organization of production,
distribution, and consumption, and through its concomitant creation
and maintenance of the person as a self-aggrandizing profit- and
preference-maximizer. Anticommodifiers tend to assume that we
are living under a regime of universal commodification, with its at-
tendant full-blown market methodology and market rhetoric. They
also tend to assume that universal commodification is a necessary
concomitant of commodification in the narrower sense-the exist-
ence of market transactions under capitalism.
Ultimately, laboring to produce commodities turns the worker
from a human being into a commodity, "indeed the most wretched
of commodities." Marx continued:
The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more
commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the
world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devalua-
tion of the world of men. Labour produces not only com-
modities; it produces itself and the worker as a
commodity-and does so in the proportion in which it pro-
duces commodities generally. 89
It is interesting to look at commodification in the ancient law sys-
tems, which are sometimes romanticized by Marxians as representa-
tions of a collectivist past.90 Rather than showing a lack of
commodification that one would expect in pre-capitalist states, these
88. Kelley & Evans, supra note 21. The ratio that Western Europeans think proper is
slightly lower. Of course, the actual difference between salaries in the United States is much
wider, at least 110 to one ($1.1 million for professional baseball players and $10,000 for unskilled
service workers).
89. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1871-72 (1987)
(quoting Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 70-71 (R. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1984)).
90. Certainly, there were more collectivist systems than are present under capitalism, but
private property was overwhelmingly the rule, not the exception. See PAOLO GROSSI, AN AL-
TERNATIVE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1981); Robert C. Ellickson &
Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
321 (1995); J.G. Manning, Demotic Egyptian Instruments of Transfer as Evidence for Private
Ownership of Real Property, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237 (1995); J.N. Postgate, Land Tenure in the
Middle Assyrian Period: A Reconstruction, 34 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFRICAN STUD. 496
(1971); Marvin A. Powell, Elusive Eden: Private Property at the Dawn of History, 46 J. CUNEI-
FORM STUD. 99 (1994); Johannes M. Renger, Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership
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ancient law systems are marked by the reduction of people to their
prices to a degree that looks almost incomprehensible to us. Ancient
commodification, to be sure, was different in kind and extent than
commodification under capitalism. Yet virtually all of the law collec-
tions, and especially the Germanic ones, set prices that appear to rep-
or Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia From the End of the Fourth to the End of
the First Millennium B.C., 71 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 269 (1995).
Yet the extended family or the clan was much more commonly the basis for the social and
legal organization of the society. For example, collective payment of fines by family members
was common. Families were frequently required to bear liability for the wrongs of family mem-
bers. See ZE'EV W. FALK, HEBREw LAW IN BIBLICAL TIMES 73 (1964); POSNER, supra note 22,
at 193-96; David Daube, Two Notes on Communal Responsibility, 36 Soc. REV. 24 (1944); Saul
Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern
Law, 71 C-n.-KErrr L. REV. 85 (1995).
The Laws of the Hywel DDA (Wales, ca. 928-1200) have a particularly elaborate scheme.
Relatives pay 8/9ths of the penalty for murder, their contribution varying according to how
closely related they are to the murderer. THE LAW OF HYWEL DDA, supra note 9, at 146-47;
WELSH MEDIEVAL LAW 185 (A.W. Wade-Evans trans., 1909).
E. Neufeld argues that, "Joint responsibility or collective responsibility, common among the
Semites and widespread all over the primitive world, was predominant among the Hittites."
NEUFELD, supra note 60, at 116. For example, in the Hittite Laws (Asia Minor, ca. 1400 B.c.), the
penalty for disobeying the king was the ruin of the house, that is, the "whole household and
family." See GURNEY, supra note 28, at 93, 99 (discussing § 173 of the Hittite Laws).
Drew points out that in Frankish law, the family might pay, as well as receive compensation:
If a man by himself did not have sufficient property to pay the entire composition
assessed against him, he could seek help from his closest kin, father and mother first,
then brothers and sisters. If sufficient help was still not forthcoming, more distant
members of the maternal and paternal kin (up to the ... second cousins...) could be
asked to help. This responsibility of the kin to aid their kinsmen is known in Frankish
law as chrenecruda ....
THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS, supra note 76, at 40. The wife and her family were not liable
to pay, nor were the husband's family liable for the wife's family's tort debts. Id.
The T'ang Code (China, ca. A.D. 653), punishes family members of persons who committed
certain of the ten abominations, even if they had no knowledge of the wrong. Tim T'ANG CODE:
VOLUME 1, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 4. Likewise, public officials who worked with
a corrupt official may be punished even when they had no knowledge of the wrong.
In one Neo-Assyrian document that Martha Roth analyzes, the murderer must give his own
daughter to the son of the murder victim. Martha T. Roth, Homicide in the Neo-Assyrian Period,
in LANGUAGE, LrTRATURE, AND HISTORY 351 (67 AM. ORIENTAL SERIES) (Francesca
Rochberg-Halton ed., 1987). In the Laws of Hammurabi (Mesopotamia, ca. 1750 B.c.), children
can be put to death for the wrongs of their parents-and in the Middle Assyrian Laws (Mesopo-
tamia, ca 1076 B.c.), wives can be raped as payment for their husbands' raping a virgin. Rom,
supra note 4, at 174-75 (§ 55). The text ambiguously implies that the wife of the rapist stays with
the victim's father. Westbrook provides a large number of ancient Mesopotamian and Biblical
examples of wives, daughters, sons, and even sisters being given over into slavery in payment for
delicts. See Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1643-45.
Sometimes entire cities were responsible for crimes if they could not catch the criminal.
Martha Roth discusses a document from the Neo-Assyrian period in the form of a debt-note,
binding the entire village to pay compensation to the kin of a murdered stranger if any kin
should claim compensation. Roth, supra. In the Laws of Hammurabi (Mesopotamia, ca. 1750
B.c.), the city and the governor are responsible for stolen property if someone establishes a theft
and no thief is caught. ROTH, supra note 4, at 85 (§ 23). O.R. Gurney argues that such city
responsibility was found as well in medieval Islam, Deuteronomy, and Hittite law. GURNEY,
supra note 28, at 97-98 (discussing Deuteronomy, XXI. 1-10 and the Hittite Laws, § IV).
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resent the value of people. 91 James Whitman has argued against the
Weberian thesis that the state arose to monopolize violence, since this
explanation does not fit easily with the emphasis of most early law
collections on setting just prices. 92
Further, debt slavery was the common backstop when people or
their families were unable to pay. A common ancient solution for the
inability to pay high fines was slavery or servitude-either debt slav-
ery until a debt was paid, perpetual chattel slavery, or debt servitude
that approached slavery. Raymond Westbrook attributes this form of
slavery to most of the ancient Near Eastern legal cultures.93 As one of
several examples, he cites Exodus 22:2. There a burglar owes a ran-
som to the householder. If he cannot pay the ransom, the burglar is to
be sold "for his theft."94 Similarly, in the Laws of Hammurabi (Meso-
potamia, ca. 1750 B.C.), when a negligent farmer has flooded the
whole district and cannot pay the damages, his neighbors may sell him
and his property and divide the proceeds.95
Martha Roth gives an example from a Neo-Assyrian document,
where, "[u]nable to pay the penalty imposed, the manslayer, his entire
household, and his fields have been seized. '96 This is consistent with
the payment for homicide set out in the Middle Assyrian Laws (Meso-
potamia, ca. 1076 B.C.), in which a victim may take the wrongdoer or
instead receive property or the killer's daughter or son.97 Another
Neo-Assyrian trial report appears to provide for the giving into slav-
ery of the robber's wife and daughter as compensation for his rob-
bery.98 Other Mesopotamian reports include one in which a thief is
ordered into slavery, but he convinces the king to let the theft victim
take the thief's sister into slavery instead.99
For the Lombards, Katherine Fischer Drew explains debt slavery
for wrongs simply:
91. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
92. Whitman, supra note 25, at 81.
93. Westbrook, supra note 38; see also, Definition and Discussion of Slavery and Serfdom,
supra note 38, at 283-97; From Freedom to Slavery, supra note 38, at 84-85.
94. Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1644-45.
95. Id. (mentioning Laws of Hammurabi, § 53-54).
96. Roth, supra note 90, at 356.
97. ROTH, supra note 4, at 157 (§ A 10). I have used Roth's date. Klaas R. Veenhof places
manuscript A at 1175 B.C. and notes that the laws may go back to the 13th and 14th Centuries
B.C. Veenhof, supra note 35. Raymond Westbrook dates the Middle Assyrian Laws to the 13th
century B.C. Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1633. Note that all these dates come from 1995
sources.
98. Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1645.
99. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
If an offender were unable to pay the fine of twenty solidi or less, he
was to be handed over to the injured party to serve as a debt slave
until such time as the sum of the debt was worked out. If, however,
the fine involved was a larger sum, the guilty man was turned over
to the injured party to serve permanently as a debt slave.' 00
Similarly, for the Franks:
It is difficult to know how many Frankish families could pay such
sums [large fines as compensation], but it must have often been the
case that the money penalties could not be paid. The Frankish laws
are clear on this point-a man's entire property and his person were
the final security for payment. In the long run then, a man's person
must frequently have paid for his offense-in effect, he became a
slave to the injured party (perhaps the injured party could inflict
death but, given the emphasis on compensation, slavery must have
been the usual effect of the law).1 1
Debt slavery is also found in other Germanic cultures, such as the
Visigoths. Indeed, the Visigothic Code (Spain, ca. A.D. 654)102 is note-
worthy because several extreme punishments are often mandated to-
gether or in the alternative. For example, under the Visigothic Code,
the punishment for selling or giving away a male or female freeborn
person is 100 solidi.10 3 But if the person cannot afford to pay it, then
the wrongdoer becomes a slave of the victim. Thus, slavery is the ex-
plicit alternative for those free persons unable to pay the high fine. If
a (debt or chattel) slave did the same wrong to a free person, then 200
lashes, scalping, and perpetual servitude were the punishments. 0 4
Scott comments that "few penalties are more common than that in-
volving the forfeiture of freedom."'10 5
Interestingly, the obligation to pay the debt resulting from a seri-
ous delict sometimes was explicitly recognized in the form of a debt-
note.'0 6 Martha Roth discusses just such a note binding a village as
debtor to pay a debt to the blood relative of a murdered stranger as
creditor, if any relatives came forth to claim compensation. 0 7 In
some of the Germanic systems, when the judge had ordered compen-
sation, "the defendant offered security or a pledge for his eventual
payment of the decree."'10 8
100. THE LOMBARD LAWS, supra note 27, at 28.
101. THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS, supra note 76, at 50.
102. THE VISIGOTmIC CODE, supra note 83.
103. Id. at Book V, tit. IV, § 11.
104. Id.
105. Id. at xxxvi.
106. Roth, supra note 90.
107. Id.
108. THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS, supra note 76, at 37.
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Westbrook explains other sorts of debt servitude that perhaps
stop just short of slavery, for example, the Old Babylonian practice of
"kigtum" in ancient Mesopotamia. 0 9 Section 117 of the Laws of
Hammurabi (Mesopotamia, ca. 1750 B.C.) provides for a man selling
his wife and children into debt service (ki§Mtim) for three years if he
is unable to pay his debts.110 In a Neo-Assyrian document, a father
sells his daughter to a creditor to pay for a debt of thirty shekels of
silver."1
Even in ancient systems that relatively humanely punished most
wrongs by private actions to compensate injured parties based on a
published price schedule, the "punishment" of debt slavery lurked be-
hind the payments owed-often mandating a payment so high that
compromise, kin payments, or slavery were the common outcomes. 112
The Welsh Laws of Hywell DDA (Wales, ca. 928-1200) provide that if
even one penny of the wrongdoer's penalty is left unpaid, the wrong-
doer may be killed for the penny difference, "since the complete can-
not come from the incomplete."' 1' 3
Lacking a full-fledged modern liberal distinction between persons
and property, ancient societies often deemed people equivalent to
property, deemed people a form of property, and deemed them a sub-
stitute for debt.114 The evidence here suggests that the commodifica-
109. Westbrook explains:
kiffltum
Like distraint, this Old Babylonian term refers to a non-consensual form of servi-
tude, but in this case it arose ex delicto. It appears to have been the penalty for certain
minor offenses, such as petty theft.
The basic system of retribution for offenses that would be regarded as crimes in
modem legal systems was a dual right that accrued to the victim (or his family): 1)
revenge against the culprit (or his family), or 2) the acceptance of a payment by way of
ransom in lieu of revenge. This right was a legal right, regulated by the courts who
intervened to fix not only the appropriate level of revenge but also, in less serious cases,
the appropriate ransom. In the latter case, revenge was only available if the ransom
was not duly paid. Kigdtum reflected this duality, falling at the lower end of the scale.
Revenge was loss of freedom; if the culprit could not pay the ransom . . . , the victim
was entitled to take the culprit or members of his family ... into servitude [until the
debt was paid].
Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1638.
110. RoH, supra note 4, at 103 (§ 117).
111. Westbrook, supra note 38, at 1644.
112. Chattel slavery is also imposed by some systems. In the Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet,
the penalty for an adopted son declaring that his adoptive parents are not his parents is that his
parents shall sell him into chattel slavery. ROTH, supra note 4, at 44 (§ 4). The Middle Assyrian
Palace Decrees (1273-1244 B.C.) also provide for slavery for sons of a wrongdoer. Id. at 199
(§ 5).
113. THE LAW OF HYWEL DDA, supra note 9, at 146.
114. For a sensitive account of the growing commodification of debt in England under capi-
talism, see Clinton W. Francis, Practice, Strategy, and Institution: Debt Collection in the English
Common-Law Courts, 1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 906-07 (1986).
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tion of humans was not a capitalist creation. Indeed, one might argue
that capitalism (and its political philosophy, liberalism) in some re-
spects decreased the commodification of humans, even as Marx is cor-
rect that it certainly increased the commodification of their labor.
One of the basic tenets of liberalism is the split between person and
property1 5 and the resulting removal of persons themselves from the
marketplace. As Western liberal capitalism spread around the world,
this distinction helped free the world's slaves, thus reducing the scope
of allowable commodification of humans. 116 To make the extremely
complicated argument hinted at in this paragraph would require my
looking at the last 1,000 years of commodification, not the first 3,000
years that is the subject of this Article. I will not make such an effort
here. But the tables in this Article suggest serious problems with the
standard notions of commodification.
VII. CONCLUSION
If you sin against this treaty... may they use you like women in the
sight of your enemy.
-The Assyrian Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon.1 7
Although this Article is part of a growing movement to use em-
pirical techniques to analyze legal questions, one cannot understand
the world or its history with just numbers. Indeed, most of the world
can and should be understood without counting. Even for those parts
of existence appropriate to counting, ordinary reasoning is always
needed to comprehend what the numbers mean. 118 One must decide
whether the numbers can be generalized to other times and places,
what influences might cause the numbers, and which scraps of the
richness of real life have been captured in abstractions that we call
variables. In part, I am trying to expand in time and place the range
115. See PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 7 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1978)
(MacPherson, critical of private property, nonetheless points out: "The change in common us-
age, to treating property as the things themselves, came with the spread of the full capitalist
market economy from the seventeenth century on .... "). For both positive and negative views
of the effects of markets and contracts on people, see Radin, supra note 89, at 1872; NoMos
XXXI, MARKETS AND JUSTICE (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989); Albert 0.
Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1463, 1483 (1982); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do
Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483.
116. See PATTERSON, supra note 16.
117. 2 THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 65, 68 (James B. Pritchard ed., abridged ed. 1975) (Assyr-
ian treaty).
118. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE (1979).
[Vol. 71:149
1995] MEASURING THE VALUE OF SLAVES AND FREE PERSONS 211
of questions that might be considered appropriate for quantitative
legal analysis.
Nonetheless, the statistical techniques that I used are rudimen-
tary. To locate my analysis in a legal system's context, I have set
prices for wrongs as a percentage of the price for harming the fully
free class and then averaged the means of the percentages. The use of
tests for statistical significance would be inappropriate. Typical signif-
icance tests assess sampling error in random sampling. There is no
reason to believe that my sample is random, the sample is closer to the
population of relevant available provisions than to a sample, and the
primary sources of error are (1) coding error due to interpretive
problems and (2) the failure to control for other important variables.
Some of these uncontrolled variables are demonstrably important,
such as who receives the payment (e.g., Gortyn"19). Depending on
how restrictive the view one takes of the population of interest, sam-
pling error is either trivially small or simply not quantifiable.
A second goal of this Article-and the prime reason that I first
suggested this conference-is to try to expose modern law professors
and legal theorists to some of the richness of ancient law.120 Histori-
ans, translators, and area experts do not need to be told this, but we
law professors are an ignorant lot. We tend to mine the same veins
again and again. Even when we move into new areas-for example,
gender studies and critical race studies-we tend not to examine the
richness of the ancient past for illustrations of the phenomena we are
describing. If one is trying to analogize modern forms of dehumaniza-
tion, one does not have to look hard in ancient law collections to find
similar-sometimes even more brutal-forms. Dehumanization is
patent when a lawgiver's idea of corrective justice is to allow the fa-
ther of a raped daughter to rape the rapist's wife. 21
My approach to examining one form of dehumanization in an-
cient law has been to examine the relative valuation of slaves, free
persons, freed slaves, and nobility. By setting out the prices for
wrongs done to various classes of persons, these ancient codes and law
collections have several advantages. First, they make one aspect of
119. See supra Tables 10-11.
120. The other goal was to expose ancient law experts to some of the work of modem legal
theorists with interests in ancient law, such as Saul Levmore, Robert Ellickson, and Geoffrey
Miller (and more recently, myself).
121. See Roam, supra note 4, at 174-75 (Middle Assyrian Laws, § A, 55): "If a man forcibly
seizes and rapes a maiden who is residing in her father's house [and is an unengaged virgin] ....
the father of the maiden shall take the wife of the fornicator of the maiden and hand her over to
be raped ......
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the social structure explicit. Second, they frequently put free persons
on the same scale, giving a base for comparison generally not avail-
able by looking at other sources for price information, such as the
prices that slaves fetched at auction. 122 Third, the lawgivers often
solved the incomparability of persons problem in economics by as-
signing different prices to different classes. Fourth, the ancient lawgiv-
ers were more willing than modem lawgivers to reflect social
differences in the laws themselves. With less egalitarian rhetoric to
contend with, the lawgivers could give freer reign to their prejudices.
So what are the results? According to the data presented here,
slaves were valued at a mean of only 33% of a free person. Freed
slaves were valued at only 53% of free. Nobility showed a wide varia-
tion, averaging 4.65 times the value of a free person.
What historical and theoretical propositions does this Study sup-
port, if only suggestively?
(1) Setting just prices was an important feature of almost all an-
cient legal systems.
(2) The low valuation of slaves and in some systems the high
relative penalty for dignitary wrongs against higher classes support the
historical view that a distinguishing characteristic of slaves is that they
lack honor.123
(3) The ascribed value of slaves across a wide variety of ancient
legal systems was remarkably similar (25-47% for codes with more
than one relevant provision), suggesting substantial uniformity in the
relative social distance between ordinary slaves and ordinary free per-
sons. This finding is particularly striking when one considers that the
meaning of "slave" varied across ancient cultures.
(4) The ascribed value of freed slaves and half-free persons was
similar and substantially uniform across ancient legal systems (values
ranged from 33% to 68%).
(5) Even within the broad classes of slaves or free persons, the
differences within systems are sometimes large. For example, some
slaves belonging to the king are valued at 33 times more than other
slaves. In one instance, wrongs to some nobles are punished 34 times
more seriously than wrongs to other nobles.
(6) The different penalty structure in India's Laws of Manu (fo-
cusing more on the pollution of the wrongdoer than on the harm to
122. Cf. PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 168-69 (comparing the value of slaves to money and
animals).
123. See id. at 13-32.
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the victim) suggests that there is no universal pattern governing the
social structure of punishment.
(7) Because all societies studied here were significantly stratified,
this study lends additional support for contentions that all large ob-
served societies are and have been socially stratified. 124 Further, the
ancients appear to have had a prestige scale that was formally re-
flected in their laws.
(8) The laws of some ancient societies reflect many fine class gra-
dations, while others reflect only two or three classes.
(9) The mean difference between the values of free persons and
the nobility (4.65 to 1) is roughly similar to modem Western notions
of the proper income difference between high prestige jobs and low
prestige jobs (about 4 to 1 in the United States). 125
(10) Ancient legal codes show both significant similarities and
significant differences. Note that most of the first nine propositions
seesaw between those that lean toward uniformity in ancient law and
those that lean toward heterogeneity.
(11) Freed slaves were still dependent classes, not far above the
class of slaves.
(12) Like the antebellum American South, if an ancient system
distinguished between field slaves and household slaves, household
slaves were more highly valued.
(13) Slaves performed an extremely wide variety of tasks in an-
cient societies. 126
(14) Economic value was in part a determinant of ascribed value
recognized by the state. Indeed, highly skilled slaves were sometimes
valued above the average free class.
(15) The penalty for wrongs was based, not only on social class,
but on economic value, the type of wrong, and who received payment.
(16) Slavery was very common in highly developed ancient socie-
ties,127 more common than would be suggested by Orlando Patter-
124. See ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 21-40, 377-92 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul
trans., 1915); Kingsley Davis & Wilbert E. Moore, Some Principles of Stratification, 10 AM. Soc.
REV. 242 (1945); Melvin M. Tumin, Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis, 18 AM.
Soc. REV. 387 (1953).
125. Kelley & Evans, supra note 21.
126. See PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 299 (a grand vizier in the Ottoman Empire was a
slave).
127. M.I. Finley argues that the conditions necessary for slavery were:
[P]rivate ownership of land, with sufficient concentration to require a permanent work-
force; a sufficient development of commodity production and of markets; and the un-
availability of an alternative, 'internal' labour supply.
FINLEy, supra note 30, at 132.
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son's estimate that about 35% of a supposedly representative sample
of world societies (ancient, modern, and local) had slavery.128
(17) A systematic look at the valuation of social classes has al-
lowed me in one case to correct some of the translator's own miscon-
ceptions about the code he translated-S.P. Scott's Visigothic Code.
(18) Commodification of humans is not a capitalist invention
(though the particular kind of commodification that we live under
may be).
(19) The scope of empirical legal studies can be profitably ex-
tended in time, place, and subject.
Most law and economics scholars who have looked at ancient law
have found the invisible hand of efficiency working itself out to near
perfection. Although I will not here engage in an analysis of whether
these ancient law systems are efficient, the pervasiveness of slavery in
almost all of these systems raises a serious challenge to the efficiency
of ancient law.
Slavery usually, but not always, 129 has a strong economic base-
and yet, is it efficient for people beyond the slaveowners? It is un-
likely (but not impossible) that any slave-based system could be effi-
cient in most non-trivial senses of that word. If efficiency is measured
by wealth-maximization, it would be hard to maximize wealth without
labor moving to its highest and best use. Slavery prevents this move-
ment. Further, it is certain that widespread chattel slavery could not
be based on consent, which some other modern economists posit as a
logical prerequisite for efficiency analysis.130
128. See PATrERSON, supra note 16, at 345-48 (finding slavery in 66 of 186 societies in
George P. Murdock's sample of world cultures).
129. See PATrERSON, supra note 16 (discussing the ritual slaughter of slaves at celebrations,
housebuilding and the like among Northwest Coast Native Americans). "Nothing in the annals
of slavery can match the Indians of the U.S. northwest coast for the number of excuses a master
had for killing his slaves and the sheer sadism with which he destroyed them." Id. at 191. Such
brutal extravagance would be unlikely in systems where slave labor was needed; there the brutal-
ity takes a different form. And it is anachronistic for Americans, who have the United States
situation in mind, to believe that slaves were everywhere purchased primarily for work or sex.
See id. at 173.
130. If one posits Pareto optimality as the guide, then either these systems are not efficient
or they illustrate the irrelevance of Pareto optimality. After all, eliminating slavery would prob-
ably make someone worse off. Thus, strictly speaking, almost any existing system-even one as
repugnant and wasteful as slavery-cannot be improved without violating Pareto optimality.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency runs up against the same problems as wealth-maximization.
Only some public choice version of efficiency could be plausibly borne out in an ancient
slave system. Perhaps these systems are efficient for the slave-owners, who have captured the
state and turned it to their own use. But this is not the sort of efficiency that modern law and
economics professors have typically found in ancient law. And the relevance of public choice to
non-democratic systems is questionable anyway. The system may nonetheless be efficient in the
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The data in this Study are consistent with a supposition that law
was a tool of enforcing class hierarchy across all ancient legal systems
that were sophisticated enough to develop a code of laws. The data
does not prove that law served this function, because a causal link
could be shown only by establishing a counter-factual-what would
have happened if the law were different or absent. Perhaps legal rules
that look to us as enforcing hierarchy simply reflected what was. Or
perhaps they even worked to reduce pre-existing differences-per-
haps, but I doubt it. Further, the mere payment of different levels of
compensation to different sorts of victims would tend to perpetuate
some class differences, by making some richer and some poorer.
On the other hand, these ancient systems suggest that the tradi-
tional account of commodification is at least flawed-if not in some
sense backwards. Commodification of humans is not an invention of
capitalism, appearing to an extreme degree in the ancient law systems
sophisticated enough to have promulgated a code or law collection.
Commodification is just one of the many theoretical issues that have
been too little examined using the strange lights of the ancient law
collections.
more limited sense favored by public choice theorists. The powerful may have captured the law
and designed it to be economically efficient for them.

